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INTRODUCTIONS CENT of a Woman,' the riveting movie that earned Al Pacino an
Academy Award for best actor, provides an unexpected metaphor for
the legal and ethical responsibilities of the lawyer who represents elderly
clients. At a time when retired people are still inaccurately stereotyped
1. (City Lights Films 1992).
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as weak, passive, doddering and dependent septuagenarians,' Pacino's
portrayal of Lieutenant Colonel Frank Slade provides a striking counter-
example. The retired army officer, though physically handicapped, is
shown to have a powerful personality of depth and dimension, biting wit,
penetrating perception, irreverence, and a subtle, though iconoclastic,
charm.
To be sure, Slade is not very elderly, having been medically discharged
from the army only a few years prior to the story's opening. But even
though Slade enjoys relative youth, he suffers from a serious disability; he
was blinded in the explosion that ended his military career. When first
we meet him, Slade lives an increasingly isolated existence in the con-
verted garage behind his niece's house, consumed by self-pity, alcohol,
military bluster, and the memories of past glories.3
The movie begins when prep school student Charlie Simms4 responds
to a job notice seeking care for a homebound relative over the
Thanksgiving weekend. Charlie's expectation of a quiet holiday caring
for a disabled retiree is shattered by Slade's plan to have a final weekend
fling featuring the best of New York City: a suite at the Waldorf-Asto-
ria, dinner at the Oak Room, and a search for the "scent of a woman"
with whom he may dance a breathtaking tango.
From the beginning of the movie the audience can see that Slade longs
to go beyond his solitary existence in his converted garage, and have a
meaningful life in which he has an opportunity to have control over his
environment. He feels that his weekend with Charlie will be his last
chance to take risks and achieve any sort of personal success. Slade real-
izes that because of his blindness he must rely on his sighted helper Char-
lie in order to reach his goals. Each scene in the movie reveals just a little
more about Slade and forces us to think, as does he, about what it means
to be alive and aging, and about the relationship between dependence and
independence.'
Slade is a person who realizes that his most significant individual ac-
complishments may well be behind him.' Blind, aging, and facing a di-
2. See Robert Atchley, Social Forces and Aging: An Introduction to Social Geron-
tology 285 (6th ed. 1991); Graham Fennell et al., The Sociology of Old Age 8 (1988).
3. Slade's demonstrates his frustration with his situation by his sarcastic commen-
tary. For instance, at one point Slade says of his niece's family: "I can't believe they're
my blood-I.Q. of sloths and the manners of Banshees. He's a mechanic; she's a home-
maker. He knows as much about cars as a beauty queen and she bakes cookies-taste
like wing nuts. As for the tarts, they're twits." Scent of a Woman, supra note 1.
4. Charlie is at the Baird School for Boys, the student body of which Slade describes
as "a bunch of runny-nosed snots in tweed jackets, all studying to be George Bush." Id.
5. For a more general discussion of this point, see infra part III.
6. Of course, when dealing with elderly people, the emphasis must be on the specula-
tive "may." Lawrence M. Friedman makes a powerful case against early retirement:
"Aging is an enormously variable process, and fixing retirement at 70 is arbitrary.
Mandatory retirement at 70, ... 'is uniform and nondiscriminatory.' The same could be
said for shooting everybody over 70. It is no comfort to a -igorous teacher and re-
searcher, deprived of career, job and position against his or her will, to be told that the
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minishing capacity for control, he devises an elaborate scheme that
essentially comes down to "let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we shall
die."7 Charlie Simms is the key to Slade's plan, because he provides the
physical extension-vision, support, and mobility-that Slade needs to
be whole again. That wholeness, however, is also what Slade needs in
order to effect the suicide that will obviate the need for further support.
Though Slade sees Charlie as merely the physical key to his plan,
Charlie becomes much more than a passive supporter because he in-
troduces youth, wonder, innocence, and most of all potential into Slade's
life. Slade does not realize that by making demands of Charlie, he is
reaffirming his humanity by taking control of his own life. As the film
progresses we witness the metaphorical union of two singular entities
into one. Charlie becomes the means through which Slade can express
his independence, but in achieving that independence he is drawn away
from his goal of self-destruction by Charlie's youth, vitality, and joy in
life. Together, then, Slade and Charlie confront the Big Apple, and more
than that, they confront the meaning of life and death.
In Charlie, then, we are presented with the ultimate fiduciary. Person-
ifying accepted social constraints, he is there to confront Slade with a
different view of life. By doing for Slade that which Slade cannot do for
himself, Charlie hopes that Slade will accept his rationale for life, a sort
of unexamined admonition to do the right thing. Charlie does recognize,
nevertheless, that to be alive is not simply to have mobility; it is to have
understanding, options, and a meaningful opportunity to exercise choices
among those options. The question that remains, however, is over the
issue of who should exercise those options-Frank Slade, or his helper,
Charlie Simms.
This Article explores an analogous fiduciary relationship, that of law-
yer and elderly client. In the following discussion we suggest some tenta-
tive responses to several hypotheticals that raise issues involving the duty
of confidentiality. Each hypothetical is analyzed from two distinct per-
spectives. The first perspective approaches the hypotheticals from an
"empathic" viewpoint. In a broad sense certain thoughts and feelings are
attributed to the client based on societal assumptions as to what the cli-
ent's opinions would be, often without any explicit communication by
the client. The second perspective approaches the hypotheticals from a
different standpoint, that of client autonomy. The-"autonomic" perspec-
tive seeks a consistent path through the hypotheticals using the client's
self-directing freedom and moral independence as its compass points.
Although we analyze each situation from two different perspectives,
we acknowledge at the outset that the contrast between the two views is
more symbolic than actual. In the real world, the perspective assumed
same dreadful thing is happening to everybody else born in the same year." Lawrence M.
Friedman, Mandatory Retirement Is Age Discrimination, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at
30.
7. Isaiah 22:13
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by most lawyers is more likely to reflect a blend between the desire to
express compassion and the desire to acknowledge independence. Ac-
cordingly, we urge recognition that both the empathic and the autonomic
perspectives illuminate the lawyer/client relationship by providing or-
derly points from which to approach specific questions. Still, differences
in factual interpretations, calculations of the weight to be given the nu-
ances of various contexts, and impressions about demeanor will inevita-
bly lead to differences even among consensus-seeking lawyers.
We suggest, therefore, that, rather than attempting to treat either ap-
proach as dispositive, lawyers faced with particular facts should view our
perspectives as beginning points. Each example provides an opportunity
to examine whether there is some overriding societal value to be vindi-
cated (i.e., an empathic solution) or whether the lawyer is seeking to em-
phasize pursuit of the client's legally permitted wishes notwithstanding
societal objectives (i.e., the autonomic solution). The hypotheticals dis-
cussed below, therefore, will be helpful in identifying appropriate issues
and achieving reasonable solutions.
Part I of this Article briefly introduces the lawyer's duty of confidenti-
ality. Part II presents a series of hypothetical situations involving confi-
dentiality issues relating to a lawyer's representation of elderly clients,
and analyzes each hypothetical from both empathic and autonomic per-
spectives. The Article concludes, in Part III, that, both the empathic and
the autonomic perspectives demonstrate that solutions to these ethical
issues are advanced by greater lawyer disclosure at the beginning of the
representation. We call, therefore, for lawyers to enhance their efforts at
developing and using lawyer engagement letters that explicitly detail the
terms of the representation and clearly address confidentiality issues that
may arise.
I. THE LAWYER'S DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
In considering the hypotheticals used in this Article, the view of confi-
dentiality presented by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct has
served as our point of departure.' Although not yet adopted in all juris-
dictions, the Model Rules have set the pace and direction of the develop-
8. The Model Rules are the most commonly adopted set of ethical rules. In addition
to the Model Rules, other relevant ethical codes include the 1908 Canons of Ethics and
the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, three recent projects
provide useful perspectives. The first is the American Law Institute's proposed Restate-
ment of the Law Governing Lawyers. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989) [hereinafter Restatement]. The others are studies
and commentaries prepared by probate and trust specialists under the aegis of the ABA
Probate and Trust Division and the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. See
American College of Trust & Estate Counsel Commentaries On Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 37-57 (Oct. 18, 1993) [hereinafter ACTEC Commentaries]; Anne K. Hil-
ker, ABA Special Probate and Trust Division Study Committee on Professional
Responsibility: Comments and Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in Representing
Husband and Wife (Mar. 1993) (draft on file with the Fordham Law Review). The Hilker
Report was approved by the Council of the ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
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ment of current ethical rules. Furthermore, as the principles of legal
ethics develop, there is an increasing realization of the importance of the
confidentiality principle. As new legal codes have developed, they "pro-
gress[ed] from passing reference to a lawyer's obligation of confidentiality
to extensive and controversial involvement with it."9
The prevailing view of confidentiality is that it embodies two princi-
ples: the traditional attorney-client privilege derived from litigation;' 0
and what Professor Wolfram has called the "confidentiality principle.""II
Both principles have been largely derived from fiduciary principles of
agency law (i.e., the lawyer, as agent, owes a fiduciary duty of confidenti-
ality to the client as the principal).12 Nevertheless, the confidentiality
rules governing lawyers' standards of professional conduct extend be-
yond agency law doctrine; agent-principal theory, thus, is not the only
basis for the confidentiality obligation. The theoretical foundation of
lawyer/client confidentiality also reflects the need to encourage clients to
share with their lawyers information for which they might otherwise
foresee a strategic advantage in keeping from their lawyers.13
Section, and is summarized in Malcom A. Moore & Anne K. Hilker, Representing Both
Spouses: The New Section Recommendations, Prob. & Prop., July/Aug. 1993, at 26.
9. Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 6.7.2, at 297 (1986).
10. Rejecting the Advisory Committee's thirteen proposed rules for a uniform, spe-
cific law of privilege in the federal courts, Congress left most privilege questions up to
state law. See Fed. R. Evid. 501 notes of Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 93-
650. Rule 501 reflects this decision:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political sub-
division thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Fed. R. Evid. 501; see also Restatement, supra note 8, § 118 cmt. c (setting out reasons
supporting the common law attorney-client privilege); Wolfram, supra note 9, §§ 6.1.2,
6.1.3 (tracing history and policy behind privilege).
11. See Wolfram, supra note 9, § 6.1.1, at 242. The Restatement calls this the "confi-
dentiality responsibilities of lawyers." See Restatement, supra note 8, § 111.
This broader basis for confidentiality is reflected in the usages of "confidences" and
"secrets." In the professional responsibility jargon, a "confidence" is something covered
by the attorney-client privilege, while a "secret" is something broader, covered by the
general principle of confidentiality. According to Professor Wolfram, "[t]he professional
rules cover much more than the testimonial privilege and to some extent may extend
beyond the agency rules." Wolfram, supra note 9, § 6.1.1, at 242.
12. Restatement, supra note 8, § 112 cmt. b, Reporter's Note to cmt. c; Wolfram,
supra note 9, § 6.1.1, at 242 & § 6.7.3, at 299.
13. DR 4-101(A) of the Model Code, for example, limits its protection to information
"gained in the professional relationship" (i.e. "during the representation") while Model
Rule 1.6, the counterpart, apparently extends protection to information acquired before,
during, or after the representation. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-
101(A) (1969) [hereinafter Model Code]; Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6
& cmt. (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules]. The latter states that the lawyer "shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client." Model Rule 1.6(a). As com-
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Though the lawyer's duty of confidentiality is strong, it is not absolute.
The Model Rules, Model Code, and Restatement each provide limited
exceptions to the confidentiality rule in order to prevent crime. These
exceptions are narrow; there is no broad exception, for example, that
requires the lawyer to disclose an intention to commit an act that is "un-
lawful" or "criminal." 14
In the examples that follow, the duty of confidentiality, and how that
duty affects the lawyer's conduct, will be explored in the context of sev-
eral different situations to which a lawyer representing elderly clients
might be exposed. These situations include the representation of several
members of the same family, and the representation of clients who may
be under a legal disability.
II. SOME TYPICAL SCENARIOS INVOLVING CONFIDENTIALITY
ISSUES AND POSSIBLE RESPONSES
Each of the four sections comprising this part consists of a series of
hypothetical fact patterns followed by two contrasting analyses, the first
from the empathic perspective and the second from the autonomic. The
fact patterns considered in this part range from issues that may arise in
mentators such as Wolfram have noted, furthermore, the confidentiality rule applies "to
all information relating to the representation, whatever its source." Wolfram, supra note
9, § 6.7.2, at 298. On this point, the Restatement's § 112(1) qualifiedly chooses the
broader view of the Model Rules-it extends to information acquired before or after the
representation. The Restatement thus declares, at § 112(2), that "confidential client in-
formation" consists of information learned "[d]uring the course of representing a client
... regardless of the relationship of the information to the matter involved in the repre-
sentation" and information learned "at a time before representation begins or after it ends
[if] the matter concerns a specific client.., and the information is entrusted to the lawyer
under circumstances reasonably indicating that the information is to be... safeguarded
in behalf of the client." Restatement, supra note 8, § 112. Model Rule 1.6 imposes no
such limitation. See Wolfram, supra note 9, at § 6.1.1, at 242 & 6.7.3, at 298.
A related rule which is not directly addressed here is the lawyer work product doc-
trine. It protects information prepared by a lawyer for a client in anticipation of litiga-
tion. For example, "[w]ork product protection extends to information prepared by a
lawyer without regard to whether it was communicated to the lawyer in confidence and
without regard to whether the lawyer's client or some other person was its source." Id.
§ 6.6.3, at 296. On the work product generally, see Restatement, supra note 8, at ch. 5,
Topic 3 (Tentative Draft No. 5 1992); Wolfram, supra note 9, § 6.6.
14. The Model Code allows the lawyer to reveal "the intention of his client to commit
a crime." Model Code, supra note 13, DR 4-101(C)(3). The Code also provides that a
lawyer who receives information that his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
a tribunal shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal if the client refuses to
rectify the fraud. See Model Code, supra note 13, DR 7-102(B)(1). The Model Rules,
however, allow the lawyer to reveal information "to prevent the client from committing a
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm," but there is no exception for crimes or frauds that may cause substantial
financial loss. Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.6(b)(1). On the other hand, the Re-
statement is still evolving in its position. Its drafts extend not only to preventing death or
serious bodily injury, but also to preventing (but apparently not reporting) "a crime or
fraud that threatens to cause substantial financial loss." Restatement, supra note 8, at
§§ 117A, 117B.
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representing a married couple to discussions involving the increasingly
broader groups of people with whom an elderly client is likely to interact
(e.g., children, step-children, guardians, and doctors). These relation-
ships are likely to involve varied and sensitive kinds of information, all
the way from revelations about paramours and children born out of wed-
lock to the intentions of an elderly client to disinherit the client's chil-
dren in favor of a newly favored charity.
Section A begins with the basic scenario of joint estate planning for
husband and wife. What if, for example, one of the spouses later requests
a new will to benefit a paramour or discloses an intent to divorce the
other spouse? These scenarios move on to examine possible refinements
depending on the source of the lawyer's confidential knowledge, the law-
yer's attempt to style the relationship as one of separate representation of
each spouse, the lawyer's prior representation of one of the spouses, and
the passage of a long period of time.
Section B examines hypothetical situations in which the concerns trig-
gering the lawyer's confidentiality quandary are intergenerational. Here
we consider the parent's and the child's respective interests in the would-
be testator's competency to handle the testator's assets, equality of treat-
ment of siblings, the fairness of the probable dispositive plan, and the
transfer of a family business. These issues necessarily raise concerns
about sensitive documents, such as wills, codicils, accounting instru-
ments, and powers of attorney.
Section C explores the duties of the lawyer to those outside the client's
typical circle of affection, as when the lawyer is representing a guardian
or an attorney-in-fact. Here, mismanagement and outright fraud on the
part of the fiduciary are of primary concern.
Finally, section D discusses confidentiality issues which may arise
when the client is, or is thought to be, under a disability. In this context,
the issues explored include the interaction between the confidentiality du-
ties of physicians and lawyers, the lawyer's duty to initiate protective
action on behalf of the client, and the lawyer's duties to the client's fam-
ily and the court.
In examining ways that courts and bar association ethics committees
have responded to situations like those in the examples, it becomes ap-
parent that most ethics opinions present their solutions in empathic
terms. The opinions commonly describe fact patterns and respond to
them by considering only general notions of ethical conduct. They do
not typically respond to the interest that individual clients may have in
defining the terms of their relationship with their lawyers. Courts and
ethics committees apparently have been disinclined to get into the auto-
nomic considerations of individual clients, perhaps for fear of turning
each ethical contest into a protracted battle to determine what factors
have influenced a client's decisions about his or her representation.
1204 [Vol. 62
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A. Representation of Husband and Wife
The cdnfidentiality issues arising out of representation of husband and
wife often involve estate planning. Although such issues are not unique
to the elderly, the elderly are more likely to encounter them, since they
are more likely to seek estate planning advice than younger individuals.
This section discusses confidentiality issues that arise from joint and sep-
arate representation of husband and wife.
1. Joint Representation of Husband and Wife
a. Joint Representation; Wife's Request for Codicil
Husband (H) and Wife (,V) are an elderly couple. Neither has been
previously married. They come to Lawyer (L) for estate planning advice.
L has not previously represented either spouse. L advises them of poten-
tial conflicts of interest, and H and W consent to joint representation.
Contrary to L's best judgment, they agree on mirror wills by which each
leaves the bulk of his or her estate to the survivor and the survivor leaves
the bulk of the pooled estates to their two children. Both H and W exe-
cute their respective wills. A few weeks later, W asks L to prepare a
codicil to her will, making a substantial bequest to W's paramour. W
directs L to hold this request in confidence, and indicates that H would
probably change his will if he knew about W's request.'
Empathic Analysis
Although joint representation 6 was established at the outset of the
15. This example is similar to an example in Professor Pennell's ALI-ABA outline.
See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism, and Malpractice Issues in Estate Planning
and Administration, available in WESTLAW ALI-ABA database, File No. C756 ALI-
ABA 393, at *441 (1992). See also the white paper drafted by Anne Hilker for the ABA
Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility. Hilker, supra note 8, at 12.
16. Other possible modes of representation have been considered for estate planning
and other "family" situations, namely mediation (Model Rule 2.2) and treating the fam-
ily as an entity (Model Rule 1.13). See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rules 2.2, 1.13; see
also Patricia M. Batt, The Family Unit as Client A Means to Address the Ethical Dilem-
mas Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 319 (1992) (comparing
application of different Model Rules in elder law/estate planning situations). Neither
mode of representation seems truly apposite to this situation, and neither rule offers much
guidance in resolving disclosure problems. Treating the family as an entity may be more
useful when there is, in fact, a family (as opposed to a couple) and a true "family" situa-
tion involved. Majority rule, one of the benefits of applying Model Rule 1.13, will not be
much help when only two clients are involved. Nor is the marriage as an "entity" co-
extensive with the purpose of the representation, postmortem distribution of both shared
and separate assets. Hilker, supra note 8, at n.4. Mediation does not involve true "repre-
sentation" in that a certain degree of partisanship that may be expected will not be pres-
ent. Furthermore, Model Rule 2.2 itself does not give clear direction as to possible
disclosure problems, suggesting that balancing confidentiality and the duty to inform will
be a "delicate" task. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 2.2.
There is support for opting for joint representation in estate planning for spouses in at
least one ethics opinion, although the opinion stresses the need to fully inform clients of
potential hazards-and insists on full disclosure, regardless of whether the lawyer meets
1206 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
planning stage, L's care in explaining potential conflicts will not make a
disclosure decision any easier. L faces no difficulty in determining who
the client is, or in determining what duties are owed to that client.
Rather L's difficulty lies in making a choice between the conflicting obli-
gations to his joint clients.
There is little in either ethics opinions or case law speaking directly to
husband-wife joint representation, but similar conflicts between business
partners have been more fully considered. The leading ethics opinion on
the disclosure of confidences among partners is itself divided. 7 The ma-
jority opted for protecting one partner's confidence and withdrawing
from the representation, despite the nature of the disclosure and its po-
tential for significant harm to the other partner. The minority made the
opposite choice, viewing the lawyer's loyalty to the nondisclosing partner
(and consequent duty to inform) as higher than any duty of confidential-
ity that the disclosing partner may have had the right to expect. 8 Other
ethics opinions tend to follow the majority, nondisclosure scenario, 19 but
the minority view has found a few followers.2"
In the absence of a clear rule, a balancing test has been suggested: 2' L
should weigh the known harm from nondisclosure (at least a partial de-
feat of H's testamentary intentions) 22 against the uncertain harm flowing
separately or jointly with his clients or of who actually pays the bills. See Professional
Ethics Comm. of the Allegheny County (Pa.) Bar Ass'n, Op. 4 (1983), in ABA/BNA
Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct Ethics Opinions 801:7401 (1986) [hereinafter
ABA/BNA].
17. See Committee on Prof. Ethics of the New York State Bar Ass'n, Op. 555 (1984),
in Andrew L. Kaufman, Problems in Professional Responsibility 235 (3d ed. 1989).
18. Were litigation between the partners to occur, such disclosures would not be cov-
ered by attorney-client privilege; this lack of coverage was a keystone in the minority's
reasoning. But the mere fact that information would not be covered by the attorney-
client privilege does not mean the lawyer has no duty to keep the information confidential
until a tribunal actually asks for the information. Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.6.
19. See Committee on Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp. of the Pa. Bar Ass'n, Op. 90-80,
in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:7327 (1991) (requiring no disclosure of borrower's
serious financial problems without borrower's consent when lawyer represents both bor-
rower and lender); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1476 (1981) (requiring withdrawal and forbidding disclosure to insurer of employer's po-
tential non-liability without employee's consent, when lawyer is retained by insurer to
represent both employer and employee in tort suit); Maine Prof. Ethics Comm'n of the
Board of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 47 (1984), in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:4208
(1985) (suggesting withdrawal upon lawyer's learning of a co-representative's miscon-
duct, when lawyer represents co-representatives, because multiple representation requires
objective, full representation of each party).
20. See Wortham & Van Liew v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 725, 728 (Cal. App.
1987) (holding that lawyer must disclose to third partner all information regarding the
partnership, when lawyer represented a three-member partnership and had assisted two
partners in diluting the value of the third partner's share; noting that "[i]n the context of
the representation of a partnership, the attorney for the partnership represents all the
partners as to matters of the partnership business."); see also Committee on Prof. Ethics
of the Birmingham (Ala.) Bar Ass'n, Op. 87-7 (undated), in ABA/BNA, supra note 16,
at 901:1202 (1989) (lawyer may disclose data on representation to any partner).
21. Moore & Hilker, supra note 8, at 28.
22. Or perhaps not. If the mirror wills had been preceded by some form of contract,
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from disclosure-at the extreme, a possible marital rupture or divorce.
The balancing test may be useful in situations where L knows his clients
fairly well and may be able to gauge the possibility of marital rupture
rather precisely. Here, however, L does not have any longstanding rela-
tionship with either H or W. Should L decide against disclosure, when
deciding to withdraw L will also need to consider whether his inability to
serve H loyally outweighs the possibility of disclosure inherent in an un-
explained withdrawal.23
Assuming the representation has not ended, 24 one commentator has
concluded that the balance should tilt toward disclosure.25 In this situa-
tion, L advised his clients of possible problems in joint representation,
presumptively including the need for openness and candor in achieving
each party's goals; W was free at the outset to request separate represen-
tation or a limit on confidentiality.26 Because L is not only H's lawyer,
but also represents W, who has duties to her spouse, L has two possible
sources of fiduciary duty toward H.2 7 Thus, L should suggest that W
make disclosure to H, and L should seriously consider disclosing the in-
formation on his own if W refuses.
Shifting the representation from joint to separate at this point would
not solve L's problem. Such a change would require consent from H,
which would still involve a disclosure of possible conflicts.28
Autonomic Analysis
From an autonomic perspective, the desired rule is one that has the
consequence of protecting H. An appropriate rule must aim to leave H
in no worse position than would have been the case had W made the full
disclosure, which H assumes and which his devise to her reflects (i.e. the
or, in some states, if the wills themselves contained appropriate language, the mirror wills
would be presumed irrevocable. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 590 N.Y.S.2d 127 (App. Div.
1992) (holding that a contract between parties was enforceable in equity as a means of
validating contractually expressed objectives of a husband and wife). L would then be
faced with the difficulty of explaining this to W; exhibiting loyalty to W by assisting her
in achieving her testamentary intent, would leave L in roughly the same position.
23. Moore & Hilker consider the "signal" in a withdrawal sufficiently dangerous to
W's confidentiality that they suggest in some cases, where the danger from disclosure is
significantly great, L should neither disclose nor withdraw. But the likelihood that such a
"signal" would be picked up and understood, especially by a layman, is debatable. See
Moore & Hilker, supra note 8, at 29-30; Lonnie Kocontes, Client Confidentiality and the
Crooked Client Why Silence is not Golden, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 283, 305 (1992) (not-
ing that even a large Wall Street firm did not pick up the "hint of trouble" associated
with its predecessor's withdrawal).
24. See example A.5 infra for a clear-cut post-representation disclosure situation.
25. See Jeffirey N. Pennell, Professional Responsibility: Reforms are Needed to Accom-
modate Estate Planning and Family Counseling, in 25 U. Miami Philip E. Heckerling
Inst. on Est. Plan. 1800, 1805.1 (John T. Gaubatz ed. 1991).
26. See Restatement, supra note 8, § 125(2) cmt. d (noting that jointly represented
clients may reach own agreement regarding confidentiality).
27. In some cases, a statutory duty. See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 5103 (Vest 1994).
28. See, eg., ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 8, at 41-43 (discussing disclosures by
lawyers for fiduciaries).
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jointly agreed upon mirror wills). Any other outcome robs H of auton-
omy by placing H's destiny in W's hands. Moreover, if W succeeds in
drafting her codicil, she is empowered beyond what is fair, because she is
able to exercise her will with respect to her own physical, psychological,
and social condition, as well as in substitution of the desires of H.29
The concern, therefore, is that L, without authorization from H, is
made a superseding instrument of W's will-both figuratively and liter-
ally-while simultaneously being deprived of the opportunity to assist H.
Had H knowingly and intelligently waived his opportunity to act, L's
dilemma would be eased, but in the absence of full disclosure, no such
waiver was possible.
Still, it might be argued by L that no problem exists because what
might be characterized as W's "double-cross" was precisely why H and
W were warned.30 Under the limited facts presented, however, this is no
answer. The facts do not indicate how thoroughly L advised H and W
about potential conflicts. In context, it appears that the advice was trans-
actional-about the consequences of utilizing mirror wills. Such advice-
giving, however, should be contrasted with what might best be called
marital transaction counseling."' In the latter, parties who are married
are specifically advised about the risks and benefits of joint representa-
tion, with regard to both the transaction which is the focus of their legal
representation and the implications for such transactions to the marital
union.
In the hypothetical circumstance, for example, H and W would have
been asked specifically about their wishes with respect to L's after-ac-
quired knowledge from whatever source. In the absence of such marital
transaction counseling, however, the presumption should be that each
party to the joint representation has, by the very nature of that joint
representation, waived confidentiality in favor of the other party regard-
ing all information gained by the lawyer in the course of the representa-
tion. Thus, the lawyer who jointly represents a married couple should
29. These are essentially the same considerations at work in the context of a lawyer's
representation of a partnership. Once an individual chooses to operate within a unit-
here, the marital entity-the interests of individuals in information related to that repre-
sentation should no longer be viewed as protectable from other members of that group.
See supra note 20. Moreover, viewing the lawyer's duty as arising in the context of a
marital transaction makes it unnecessary to consider such concerns as the possibility of
marital rupture or divorce. The very fact that the individuals are husband and wife and
have sought representation in that capacity should mean that all claims of confidentiality
are irrevocably waived. It is not for the lawyer to keep silent and withdraw, but for the
would-be disclosing party to keep quiet and withdraw from both the marriage and the
representation. Cf Pennell, supra note 15, at *441-51 (discussing alternatives in this
situation).
30. The facts state that, contrary to L's best judgment, L advised them of potential
conflicts of interest, and they consented to joint representation despite the warning.
31. The term "marital transaction counseling" is introduced here as a term of art. It
would apply only when a joint representation of individuals bound together by operation
of law is involved.
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only be permitted to withhold confidences and secrets from the marriage
partner when the information is not reasonably related to the representa-
tion or when it is gained following mutual termination of the representa-
tion. Conversely, the lawyer must disclose any information to the
uninformed party that the lawyer acquires which is reasonably related to
the marital transaction regardless of the wishes of the other party. Fur-
thermore this obligation cannot be defeated except by the joint actions of
the marriage partners.3 2
b. Joint Representation; Husband's Intent to Divorce After Gift
This example is the same as example A. 1.a, except that the plan also
involves a substantial lifetime gift from W to H to equalize the estates for
more favorable estate tax treatment. Before the gift is made and the wills
are executed, H confides in L that he plans to divorce W as soon as the
gift is made.33
Empathic Analysis
Unlike situation A.l.a, L is not being asked to undertake any action
which is directly adverse to client W; however, he has been given infor-
mation that may be of great value to W in the representation,' which is
clearly still continuing. Given the joint nature of the representation and
the intent that information be shared openly to further the goals of the
representation, L would seem justified either in disclosing the informa-
tion or requiring H to make the disclosure.
Autonomic Analysis
Here, as in example A.l.a, L is made the instrument of one party's
exploitation of the other. Whenever one party seeks self-enhancement by
exploiting the ignorance of the other, the lawyer's duty must be viewed in
the context of the agreement initially to proceed with a joint representa-
tion. Accordingly, the solution to this hypothetical parallels the marital
transaction counseling hypothetical. The missing element here is W's
agreement in the following form:
"L, I know that the drafting of mirror wills has all of the risks and
consequences that you have outlined for me. Despite those risks, I
have decided that absolutely nothing that H has done or might do
should deter me. My intent here is to reward H for what we have had
together that has been positive; I will leave it to a higher being in the
after-life to address (or redress) any wrongs he might have committed
or will commit towards me."
32. Of course, if in the context of representing husband and wife, the lawyer must
disclose over the objections of either, the lawyer may afterwards be required to withdraw
from the representation of both parties.
33. See Pennell, supra note 15 at *441; Hilker, supra note 8.
34. See Moore & Hilker, supra note 8, at 29-30 for the different types of disclosure
and their relative adversity.
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In other words, the autonomy principle requires that individuals be
allowed to define the objectives of their representation. This sometimes
means that the objectives identified by a client will at times differ from
those the lawyer advises, but in the absence of illegality or unforeseen
circumstances, the lawyer's primary obligation must be to do for the cli-
ent and not to the client. The lawyer is not, after all, the one who is blind
to jural relationships.35
Accordingly, because W's gift transaction is made in the context of L's
representation of H and W in a marital context (and presumes the con-
tinuation of the marriage), H's disclosure to L is relevant to the subject of
that transaction. Thus, the contemplated divorce must be disclosed.
Although L may not disclose to W information which is irrelevant to the
transaction, protection of W's autonomy requires that the disclosure
agreement contemplated as the basis for the original joint representation
must be held inviolate.36
c. Joint Representation; Gift Completed; Husband's Intent to Divorce
Same as example A. L.b, except that H confides in L after the gift is
made and the wills are executed, but before H initiates divorce
proceedings.
Empathic Analysis
As in situation A. 1.a, the uncertain status of the representation clouds
the disclosure decision. If H and W are current clients, L may be justi-
fied in disclosing to W based on the nature of the joint representation.37
If the representation has terminated, however, L may not have any justi-
fication. Moreover, H's post-representation disclosure may be seen as a
request for a new, but separate, representation. In that case, however,
L's continuing duty of loyalty to W, a former client, would require L to
decline any request to represent H against W without disclosure to and
35. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
36. It is recognized that there are relevant precedents which would suggest another
outcome. See Monroe County (N.Y.) Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 87-2. In
Monroe County Opinion 87-2 the committee held that the duty of a lawyer who acquires
information that is relevant and injurious to a cohort, is to maintain the newly acquired
information in confidence and to withdraw from representing any party, unless the law-
yer receives permission to reveal the information. The rationale is that once the lawyer
obtains the information from one cohort subject to a request to hold it in confidence from
the other, a conflict arises. Thus, the lawyer must either persuade the withholding client
to disclose or withdraw from the representation of either. This approach, however, insuf-
ficiently values the original agreement. When the basis of the joint representation is that
no party may assert a privilege against any cohort, any subsequent attempt by a party to
do so requires that the lawyer remonstrate with the withholding client, but failing that
the client should be free to make a narrow disclosure of all information necessary to
vindicate the original understanding on which the joint representation rests. See also
Russell G. Pearce, Family Values & Legal Ethics, in Legal Ethics in Representing Older
Clients, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253, 1262 n.48 (1994).
37. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing the minority view).
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consent from W.38 Nor would L have grounds to make a disclosure to W
without H's consent.39
Autonomic Analysis
When L's knowledge of H's perfidy comes after the wills are drafted
but before the divorce, the consequences to W are equally devastating,
but L has not been the instrument of W's undoing. More important, W
has not participated in her own deception by misplaced reliance on L.
To the extent that H had a strategy all along which he has now revealed,
both W and L are victims.
Still, L has a responsibility to counsel H about the consequences of his
actions and the means for avoiding negative results.' L has no right,
however, to betray H's confidences to improve W's position. Such a
breach by L would deprive H of his autonomy by denying him the legal
and moral right of divorce which, at least in the secular view, was con-
templated as a legally permissible way of terminating the marital union.
Accordingly, L's recourse does not include divulging H's confidences and
secrets, but L may counsel H regarding the consequences of his proposed
actions4 and withdraw from any future representation if he fails to per-
suade H not to go forward with the divorce.
38. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.9.
39. See Louisiana Comm. on Ethics & Prof. Resp., Op. 236 (1965), in 12 La. BJ. 337
(1965) (prohibiting disclosure to client B without client A's consent, when lawyer re-
ceives information from client A that would be beneficial to client B and not harmful to
client A); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1300
(1974) (improper for lawyer to disclose detrimental information to client A when such
information was disclosed to lawyer by client B); Michigan State Bar Ass'n, Op. CI-568,
in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:4812 (1980) (holding that without the client's con-
sent, lawyer may not reveal a client's confidences to the client's spouse).
40. Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the Model Code provides that:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A law-
yer ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so.
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal
considerations.
Model Code, supra note 13, EC 7-8.
41. At issue here for W are interrelated concerns with autonomy and dignity. The
philosopher W.K. Clifford explained this duality in another context:
If I steal money from any person, there may be no harm done by the mere
transfer of possession; he may not feel the loss, or it may even prevent him from
using the money badly. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man,
that I make myself dishonest. What hurts society is not that it should lose its
property, but that it should become a den of thieves; for then it must cease to be
society. This is why we ought not to do evil that good may come; for at any
rate this great evil has come, that we have done evil and are made wicked
thereby.
Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values 65 (1965) (quoting W.K. Clifford).
H's actions not only rob W of her autonomy-the right to use and misuse her posses-
sions-but also serve to diminish society's valuation of itself-a dignity concern-by
turning society into a den of thieves, such that wickedness (and not humaneness) defines
it.
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d. Joint Representation; Lawyer Learns of Illegitimate Child
Same as example A.l.a, except that after the wills are executed L
learns from a third party that H has an illegitimate child who would be
included within the contingent gift to children in W's will. L knows that
H would not want L to disclose the existence of the child to W.
Empathic Analysis
As in situation A. 1.c, after the representation has commenced L learns
information that may defeat one client's goal, but here L has not been
asked to undertake any direct action (other than to protect the secret).
Even if the representation of H has terminated, and H is only a former
client, L has the same responsibility to maintain H's confidences and
secrets, regardless of how L acquired the information;42 therefore, L
would have no justification for revealing H's confidences to W. If the
representation has not terminated, in addition to the factors discussed in
A. 1.a, L must consider how closely related this confidence is to the goal
of the representation.43
Autonomic Analysis
The existence of H's previously undisclosed child within the class of
contingent beneficiaries does not change the result we want. That result
remains consistent with that described above." W's agreement to pro-
vide a contingent class gift necessarily authorizes a gift to H's illegitimate
child. Thus, the relevant question in such a situation does not go to the
operation of the will, but to whether the meaning of the class gift was
explained to W. If not, in the absence of justification, L is guilty of mal-
practice if and when the contingent claim by the illegitimate offspring
becomes significant. Accordingly, L should counsel H about this secret,
advise W of the effects of the will as drafted if H refuses to do so, and
withdraw from future representation of either party if disclosure is re-
quired over H's objection.
e. Joint Representation; Husband Discloses Illegitimate Child
Same as example A. 1.d, except H discloses the existence of the illegiti-
mate child to L and requests confidentiality.45
42. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.9.; Restatement, supra note 8, § 112.
43. The no-confidence rule extends only to the goals of the representation, e.g., in the
representation of a partnership, any information concerning the partnership itself. See
Restatement, supra note 8, § 125 cmt. d. While the existence of an illegitimate child
would appear to fit this definition of non-confidential, representation-related information,
the connection is not so direct as in situations A.l.a and A.1.b, and this may further
complicate L's decision.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
45. See Hilker, supra note 8, at 13.
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Empathic Analysis
The actual method by which L learns of the existence of the illegiti-
mate child will not affect L's decision to disclose. However L learns of
H's confidences and secrets, he is no less bound to respect them. As in
situation A. 1.d, L will have to consider the status of the representation.
If the representation has terminated, L has no justification for disclosing
the existence of the illegitimate child to W. If the representation is con-
tinuing, L will have to consider the relation of the confidence to the
representation.
Autonomic Analysis
When the variation provides that H has disclosed the existence of the
illegitimate child and requested that the fact be held confidential from all
(including W),4 L is faced with the dilemma of whether to protect the
confidence of one client at the expense of the other. Absent the kind of
above-noted "after-life" agreement,47 L has no right to choose between
the interests of his clients. To do so raises the previously precluded pos-
sibilities of autonomy deprivation.48 Still, the controlling consideration
is that identified in response to hypothetical A. 1.a, the marital transac-
tion counseling context.49 Accordingly, L must disclose to the unin-
formed party all information related to the transaction for which L was
engaged to represent H and W.
2. Separate Representation of Husband and Wife
In the preceding examples, assume that L advised H and W of poten-
tial conflicts of interest, and they all agreed that L would represent each
spouse separately.
Empathic Analysis
If H and W agree at the outset on separate representation, L will have
no justification in making disclosures without consent in any of these
situations. L's decision becomes one of withdrawal rather than disclo-
sure, assuming in each of the continuing-representation situations that
the confiding spouse does not give consent for disclosure."0 No Model
Rule or Model Code provision would give L the authority to disclose this
46. The facts do not specifically assume total confidentiality, meaning a private com-
munication to L, but absent total confidentiality L has even less basis for withholding the
information.
47. See supra example A. 1.b.
48. See id.
49. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (the presumption should be that
each party to the joint representation has, by the very nature of the husband/wife joint
representation, waived confidentiality in favor of the other in regards to all information
gained by the lawyer in the course of the representation).
50. Under the Model Rules and the Model Code, L would be unable to continue
representing both spouses in at least situations A.l.a, A.l.b, and A.l.c, if not all the
situations, without full disclosure to, and consent from, the non-confiding spouse. See
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information without consent;5' in the foregoing examples, L's authority
comes from the nature of the representation itself.
Autonomic Analysis
We are asked to assume that L has, in fact, advised H and W of the
potential conflicts of interest and that they have, nonetheless, agreed that
he should represent their separate interests.52 It is unlikely, however,
that such an arrangement could be satisfactorily concluded. The overrid-
ing obstacle is the autonomy principle. Once we assume that the law-
yer's primary duty is to provide support for his or her client, any
arrangement where it can reasonably be foreseen that irreconcilable obli-
gations of support exist is prohibited to the lawyer. 3
Here, even assuming representation until the time of an actual conflict,
the representation of each spouse separately could last only until con-
fronted with the actual conflicts posed by any of the supposed
revelations.
Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.7; Model Code, supra note 13, DR 5-101(A), 5-
105(A).
51. An exception might be made in states with more relaxed confidentiality rules,
allowing for disclosure for fraud likely to cause serious injury to another's financial inter-
ests. Given H's and W's respective fiduciary duties, an argument might be made that
some of these situations amount to constructive fraud. See New Jersey Advisory Comm.
on Prof. Ethics, Op. 586, in 117 N.J. L.J. 533 (1986) (holding that when a new client has
information showing fraud practiced on a former-client wife by her husband, the lawyer
may disclose the information to the wife, despite potential harm to the new client).
For an opinion allowing disclosure to a separately-represented client, albeit under unu-
sual circumstances, see New York County (N.Y.) Law. Ass'n, Op. 270 (1929), in Olavi
Maru & Roger L. Clough, Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions 213 (1970) (holding
that a lawyer was justified in informing client A of client B's past criminal record, when
client A was preparing to marry client B, and when a morals charge which was public
record was involved).
52. The circumstance of separate representation being requested by husband and wife
differs in an important respect from the previous hypotheticals discussed-all instances in
which a married couple sought joint representation. Previously the parties sought repre-
sentation in support of their legally sanctioned unity (i.e., the marriage). Here the parties
seek simultaneous representation which is in derogation of their legally sanctioned union.
This circumstance should be discouraged.
53. "Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will
be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal
interests." Model Code, supra note 13, DR 5-101(A).
DR 5-105(A) also applies:
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely
to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted
under DR 5-105(C).
Id. at DR 5-105(A).
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3. Lawyer Has Previously Represented Husband
This situation is like that in example A. 1.a, except that L had previ-
ously represented H for many years in his general business affairs.
Empathic Analysis
L's longstanding representation of H in other affairs should not affect
the analysis in situation A. L.a. When undertaking a joint representation,
L owes equal duties to each party, regardless of relative wealth or past
relations.54 In making any disclosure decisions, L must be careful not to
let his past representation of H color his decisions. The same would be
true if the estate planning representation were separate rather than joint.
Autonomic Analysis
The assumption that L has previously represented H in his business
affairs, itself, fails to provide a basis for resolving any of the above
problems. L's previous representation of H does, however, add the con-
sideration of when the taking on of a new client is prohibited. Thus, if L
knows that W has interests adverse to H, L is prohibited from accepting
her representation.5 ' L's loyalty should be to his existing client. Fur-
thermore, if L knows that W is relying on him for legal advice, he has an
added duty to disabuse her regarding her reliance.
4. Second Marriage of Each Spouse
This hypothetical is the same as example A. L.a, except that it assumes
that the marriage of H and W was a second marriage for each spouse,
and that each had children from his or her first marriage.
Empathic Analysis
The fact that both H and W had been previously married and had
children from those other marriages would not affect L's disclosure deci-
sion. Such facts should, perhaps, have affected L's willingness to take on
a joint representation of H and W, although the presence of prior spouses
and children from earlier marriages does not automatically imply
adversity.
5 6
54. See Maine Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 47 (1984), in ABA/BNA, supra note 16,
at 801:4208 (1984) (holding that multiple representation means equal and objective repre-
sentation, and best judgment on behalf of each client); Allegheny County (Pa.) Bar Ass'n,
Op. 4, in id. at 801:7401 (1983) (holding that lawyer in estate planning joint representa-
tion must be careful to show no favoritism); State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 78-13, in
Olavi Maru, 1980 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions 51 (1982)
(holding that lawyer must represent all co-clients equally or not at all).
55. See supra note 53 (acceptance of employment when exercise of judgment may be
affected).
56. Moore & Hilker, supra note 8, at 28. H and W may still have financial considera-
tions in opting for joint representation, despite the complications, and may have begun
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Autonomic Analysis
Assuming that H and W each are involved in their second marriage
and that each had children from the first marriage, the additional issue
raised is what duty, if any, L ought to owe to the children. Of course, the
autonomy obligation is owed to clients, rather than to beneficiaries, and
even less so to potential beneficiaries. Accordingly, the lawyer must pro-
tect the interest of H and W as they have individually consented to be
represented. To the extent that such representation is precluded because
of lack of knowledge or conflicts of interest, one of the clients, if not
both, will have to be dropped.
Similarly, even assuming that an obligation is due the potential remote
beneficiaries, their interests would be subject to H's and W's knowing,
knowledgeable, consensual, and capable handling of any potential or real
conflicts of interest.
5. Request for Codicil After a Long Lapse of Time
This situation is like example A.l.a, but it assumes that W's request
for a codicil is made several years after the execution of the original wills.
In the intervening period, L has had no contact with H or W."
Empathic Analysis
Unlike situation A.l.a, here the representation seems safely termi-
nated. Nonetheless, L continues to owe both H and W duties of confi-
dentiality and loyalty. L should decline to represent W or to draft the
codicil unless W consents to a disclosure to H. Beyond that, however, L
would not seem to have any authority to disclose W's confidence to H,
because W would seem to be asking for separate representation with no
waiver of confidentiality by seeking representation alone, long after the
earlier representation.
Autonomic Analysis
In the absence of contact between L and W or H over several years,
L's obligations to either would remain fixed by the respective original
understandings between L, H and W. Of course, to the extent that there
are doubts about the nature of those understandings, pending clarifica-
tion, the doubts ought to be resolved in favor of loyalty and client
confidentiality.
B. Intergenerational Representation
This section discusses issues that arise when dealing with members of
the same family in different generations. The matters discussed relate to
the representation without expectation of adversity (especially, for example, in situation
A.l.b). See Pennell, supra note 25, 1 1803.1.
57. See Pennell, supra note 15, at 445.
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both planning for the transfer of assets and the representation of a parent
and a child on matters which may benefit the child at the expense of
siblings.
1. Aging Parent; Child Asks To Be Made Joint Tenant
Lawyer (L) has previously prepared wills for both Son (S) and aged
Father (F), who is a widower. S comes to L's office and reports that F
has become increasingly absent-minded, occasionally misplaces valuable
documents, and forgets to pay his bills with embarrassing frequency. F is
aware that S is consulting L about this matter. S asks L to explain about
joint bank accounts and L does so. L also volunteers information about
durable powers of attorney and other arrangements for property manage-
ment and succession. S thanks L for her clear explanation and says he
will take F to the bank and add his (S's) name to F's accounts as joint
tenant. L offers to explain the implications to F of creating joint ac-
counts, but S declines her offer. S pays L's customary fee. May L, with-
out S's consent, call F to explain the implications of creating joint
accounts, including the rights of a surviving joint tenant on the death of a
cotenant?58
Empathic Analysis
At first glance, L would seem to have no grounds for contacting F. S
and F appear to be separate clients and the information given to S, in-
cluding the fact that such information was given, is confidential.
At second glance, however, the situation is not so clear. Is S actually
the client? Or is S merely acting as an agent for F.1 Fs interests and
property seem to be the true issue. If S were considered an agent for F, L
could contact F, as the true confidential relation is between L and F; S
would be only a communicating agent.'
Autonomic Analysis
Where L has previously represented F, but now has been engaged to
represent S (regarding F's affairs), the controlling issue is one of conflict-
ing sequential representation. L is prohibited from undertaking any rep-
58. This example is taken from Situation 1 in Professor Donaldson's ALI-ABA out-
line. See John E. Donaldson, Ethical Considerations in Advising and Representing the
Elderly (1991), available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA database, File No. C658 ALI-ABA
1, *4. Compare Situation 2 in this outline. See id
59. Payment alone is not enough to determine that S is in fact the client. It is equally
unclear, however, whether S could be considered as F's agent. In favor of this theory
would be S's statement that he is acting on Fs behalf and his intent to use L's informa-
tion on Fs behalf.
60. L would not be required to contact F. Under an agency theory the duty of in-
forming F would fall to S. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381 (1958). But, given
that S's position falls considerably short of judicial guardianship, L would not be faced
with the same sort of disclosure problems posed in guardian-ward situations, where L
clearly represents the guardian.
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resentation which conflicts with the interest of an existing client. Thus, if
L is still F's attorney, L is precluded from representing S. Furthermore,
it is by F's reasonable understanding that the existence of a representa-
tion is to be tested.61
Put another way, what, if any, duty L owes to F is defined by their
original representation, not by L's subsequent representation of S. In-
deed, L's representation of S should not have been commenced if L har-
bored any suspicion that S's interests were likely to conflict with those of
F. Accordingly, the question raised here-May L call F to explain?-is
actually a tertiary one. The first question is the one designed to protect
and promote F's autonomy: As a result of L's representation of F, is L
facing a potential conflict of interest as regards representation of S? If
the answer is yes, the next question should be: Has L advised F and S of
the potential conflict so that each can decide whether to accept the risk of
L's representation of both or either?6" Hence, L's duty to F was not met
merely by L's knowledge that F was aware that S was consulting L. The
autonomy principle requires that F be advised in a meaningful and timely
manner of both consequences and options. The facts, moreover, are in-
sufficient to find acquiescence or ratification.
Even assuming that the answer to the second question is affirmative
and that both F and S desire that the separate representations proceed, L
was obligated not to accept representation of S if L could not reasonably
believe that both representations could proceed without an actual conflict
arising.63
Having failed in her initial obligations, however, L now owes conflict-
ing duties to F and S. To serve one is to fail to serve the other. Under
these circumstances, L should immediately tell S that L is obligated to
inform F fully regarding the implications of the various personal finance
options and then do so. If S objects, L should withdraw from the repre-
sentation of both F and S6' while explaining that her mutual obligations
pose conflicts which preclude representation of either, and urge them to
seek other counsel. This result implicitly accepts that L's advice to F
about purely legal issues (as opposed to the facts related to S) was never
of concern to S, since S knew at the outset that F was receiving legal
advice from L.
61. Conversely, if L first represented S, L would be precluded from taking on the
representation of F, without S's approval and the determination that no irreconcilable
conflicts were foreseeable. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.7(a); Model Code,
supra note 13, DR 5-105(A).
62. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.7(a); Model Code, supra note 13, DR 5-
105(A).
63. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.7(a)(1); Model Code, supra note 13, DR
5-105(C).
64. L's acceptance of the fee paid by S is assumed to be S's retainer, otherwise S is
acting as L's agent. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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2. Lawyer Prepares Power of Attorney for Daughter
Lawyer (L) has previously represented Daughter (D) and her aged
Mother (M), a widow, on various matters of separate and joint interest to
them. D comes to L's office and reports that M is beginning to have
"difficulties." M is usually lucid but occasionally acts as if her deceased
husband (D's father) is still alive. D recalls that M had held a durable
power of attorney from her husband that L had prepared. D states that
she has discussed the matter with M and that M is willing to execute a
durable power naming D as M's attorney-in-fact. D requests that L pre-
pare the power for M's signature, which D will obtain. L expresses his
willingness to explain more fully to M the implications of executing the
instrument. D declines the offer, reminding L that M, having once
served as an attorney-in-fact, knows all about powers of attorney. D
pays L's usual fee. Later L learns that D has exercised her powers under
the instrument to benefit D as opposed to her siblings.6
Empathic Analysis
D is L's client in this matter.66 L's situation is somewhat analogous to
that of an attorney representing a guardian, but not completely so. 6 Ls
previous (continuing?) representation of M and the uncertain legal status
of powers of attorney make this problem more difficult than that of an
attorney representing a guardian. A guardian acts as an officer of the
court and property dispositions are to some extent monitored by the
court. The guardian's relationship with the court is the primary determi-
nant of any disclosure authority possessed by a lawyer representing a
guardian.68
Whether D is a present or former client, L has a responsibility to keep
this information about D's actions confidential. 69 Given that L's repre-
65. This example is based on Situation 2 in Professor Donaldson's ALI-ABA outline.
See Donaldson, supra note 58; see also John E. Donaldson, The Ethical Considerations of
Representing the Elderly, Tr. & Est., July 1991, at 18, 22. (nephew seeking broad power
of attorney from uncle without attorney's direct supervision).
66. See, e.g., Virginia State Bar Council, Legal Ethics Op. 1313, in Code of Virginia
1950, Legal Ethics and Unauthorized Practice Opinions 567-68 (1991) (holding that law-
yer who draws a power of attorney for attorney-in-fact represents attorney-in-fact, not
the principal).
67. Attorneys-in-fact are generally regarded as fiduciaries. See John J. Lombard, Jr.,
Planning for Disability: Durable Powers, Standby Trusts and Preserving Eligibility for
Governmental Benefits, 20 U. Miami Philip E. Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan. 1r 1700,
1707.2 (1986). But, given that part of the attractiveness of powers of attorney is the
avoidance of the court intervention that typifies guardianship proceedings, the compari-
son is not entirely apt. See William M. McGovern, Jr., Trusts, Custodianships & Durable
Powers of Attorney, 27 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 34 (1992). Along with the lack of
court intervention and supervision, statutory provisions for powers of attorney rarely pro-
vide remedies for waste. Iat at 30. A few states do give standing to a limited class of
persons to request court intervention and supervision. Lori A. Stiegel, et al., Durable
Powers of Attorney: An Analysis of State Statutes, 25 Clearinghouse Rev. 690, 694 (1991).
68. See part II.C, infra, for a discussion of lawyer-fiduciary relations.
69. Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 5.1; Restatement, supra note 8, § 112 cmt. c.
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sentation of D may be completed and that D probably has no responsibil-
ity to report her activities to any tribunal, L has no authority to make
any disclosure regarding D's actions.7°
Autonomic Analysis
The facts, which state that L has now learned that D has executed her
durable power of attorney in a way that benefits her at the expense of her
siblings, imply that L did, in fact, draft the power of attorney for D as
requested. It was, however, improper for L to draft this agreement. L's
decision to advise D directly undercuts M's autonomy, so that the very
person to whom M thought she could turn for support is now working
against her interest.71
M, who was previously represented by L, had a right to continue to
rely upon L. Moreover, it is likely that the expectation of M's continued
reliance was what D counted upon in engaging L, rather than a stranger
attorney, to draft the power of attorney.
Without M's informed consent, L should not have accepted D as a
client in connection with a matter involving M, so L was necessarily pre-
cluded from accepting "the usual fee." Having now drafted the power of
attorney, L is in no position to challenge its exercise by D.72 Still, L may
counsel D and ask her to cooperate voluntarily with M and with her
siblings. Ultimately, however, L must withdraw from representing both
M and D.
3. Transfer of Family Business
For many years Lawyer (L) has represented Father (F) and his busi-
ness, performing a variety of family business and estate planning tasks.
As F's children have attained majority, L has prepared wills for them
and occasionally performed other tasks such as representing them in the
purchase of a house. One child, C, has become an active participant in
F's business, while another child, D, has chosen a different career. F and
C recently consulted L for preparation of a buy-sell agreement that even-
tually would transfer ownership of the business to C on terms favorable
to C. F also asked L to modify the gift in his will to D to compensate D
The Restatement specifically makes an exception for information that is generally known
and readily discoverable, such as public records. If L discovered D's misconduct from
such general information, disclosure would be permitted by the Restatement. See id. cmt.
e.
70. L's previous or continuing representation of M would not give L any disclosure
authority-unless in preparing the power of attorney L was representing both D and M,
in which case L would presumably be able to disclose to M his knowledge of D's self-
dealing. See supra example A. L.a (dealing with joint representations and confidentiality).
If M is no longer competent, L would be faced with a different set of problems, namely,
whether or not to disclose M's situation. See infra example D.2.e.
71. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (DR 5-105(A)'s duty to decline employ-
ment involving a foreseeable conflict of interest).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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partially (but not, in L's opinion, completely) for the favorable transfer to
C. Independently, D recently consulted L for a review of D's own estate
plan. Must L disclose F's recent decisions to D? May L disclose them?"'
Empathic Analysis
L would be under no obligation to disclose F's changes to D, and even
if L wished to disclose, it would be hard to find justification for that
disclosure. While L represents each member of the family, the represen-
tation of D appears to be separate from any representation of either F or
C. The transfer of the business interest seems to be a matter exclusively
involving F and C, and while there might be no privilege of confidential-
ity between F and C in this matter, D is not a party and is not entitled to
any confidential information stemming from the transfer. F's testamen-
tary changes clearly should not be disclosed to D without F's consent.74
If L believes the changes are sufficiently damaging to D, L should con-
sider withdrawal.7"
Autonomic Analysis
The key to this "family" representation is the determination of whom
L represents. Because L has represented F in his business and personal
affairs, we can fairly conclude that L at least represents F. It is neither
unusual nor forbidden for L also to represent F's business interest, so
long as F understands that a dual representation, reflective of the sepa-
rate interests of F and the business, is what is involved. On the business
side, it is also critical here that F have been advised that L represents the
corporation (if that is what is involved) and not F, for the two are not the
same. Assuming the aforesaid full disclosures, and assuming further that
there are no objections or irreconcilable conflicts, L may proceed to rep-
resent F and his business. This approach protects and promotes the au-
tonomy principle making it more, rather than less, likely that a client will
73. There is a brief reference to this kind of situation in Ronald C. Link et al., Dev'el-
opments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer The
Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 13
(1987).
74. 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2314 (John T. Mc-
Naughton, rev. 1961). See infra examples D.l.a, D.l.b, and D.3.a for a more detailed
treatment relating to the disclosure of wills and estate plans. See Committee on Ethics of
the Md. State Bar Ass'n, Op. 85-18 (undated), in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:4351
(1986) (where lawyer represents two family members in the drafting of wills, lawyer may
not disclose to either that the lawyer represents the other).
75. Although L has no ground for disclosure, L may be faced with difficulties from
this representation later on, if in fact D's interests have been significantly damaged. In
acting as attorney for both F and the favored C, especially if L has failed to inform F and
C of potential conflict of interest problems, L may have created a presumption of undue
influence that will make a later will contest more likely and more successful, and perhaps
expose L to disciplinary action. See. e.g., Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, 432 A.2d 890
(N.J. 1981) (holding that when attorney prepared estate plan and will for client's parent
which favored client more than earlier plans, only full disclosure and knowing waiver
could remove presumption of undue influence).
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be able to identify and select among the options most likely to advance
his or her self-definition.
Assuming, therefore, that the representations of F and the business are
at the center of L's representation, the key is whether L has properly
fostered that core representation, rather than what we might call the col-
lateral representations-those involving each of the children as he or she
reaches maturity and is thus able to assert his or her respective independ-
ent claim for self-actualizing autonomy. L must have satisfied himself
that no conflict existed between any particular child and any current cli-
ent (i.e., neither F nor the business); that if the potential for conflict rea-
sonably existed, all present and potential clients were fully informed
about it (so that they might make a knowing, timely, and knowledgeable
waiver); and that any actual conflict that arose was remedied by with-
drawal from the representation of one or all clients.76
Turning, therefore, to the ethics of L preparing a buy-sell agreement at
the request of F and C, when C has become an active participant in F's
business, while D has chosen a different career, the autonomy analysis
focuses sequentially on F, the business, C, and then D. Assuming that
potential conflicts between F and the business have been resolved, the
first question is whether L may jointly represent F and C. Again, if po-
tential conflicts have been disclosed and waived, L may proceed with this
representation.
The next question, therefore, is: What, if any, duty does L owe to D?
Because D is a newer client than either C, the business, or F, if L's repre-
sentation is to be expanded to include D, it must be assumed that the
appropriate new-client conflict analysis has been completed, a doubtful
assumption given these facts.
If we assume, however, that L has properly discussed potential conflict
matters with F, C, and D, L's duty would be to disclose fully all relevant
information to each. Assuming no waiver of potential conflicts, however,
L has no duty to refrain from representing F and C in preparing a buy-
sell agreement that disadvantages D. Furthermore, without F's permis-
sion, L may not undertake for D a "review of D's estate plan" which
involves revelations about F's estate plan.
C. Representations Involving a Fiduciary
This section addresses issues relating to the representation of parties
involved in the fiduciary relationships of guardian and attorney-in-fact.
1. Representation of Guardian Found To Be Involved in Self-Dealing
a. Guardian Involved In Self-Dealing; No Fraud and No Loss
Lawyer (L) represents G, the guardian of the person and property of
76. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (accepting and continuing
representation).
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E, an elderly person now a permanent resident of a nursing home. E is
senile and capable of making only the most basic decisions concerning
dress and the like, but he recognizes friends, carries on simple conversa-
tions, and is not otherwise in poor health. Prior to his representation of
G, L had no relationship with G or E. L was retained by G to secure G's
appointment as guardian and to advise G regarding the administration of
the guardianship.77
L becomes aware that G has engaged in self-dealing with E's funds.
There has been no fraud and no depletion of E's estate. (For example, G
might have sold assets of E to himself privately for fair market value.) L
plans to confront G and advise G to rescind the self-dealing transaction.
If G complies, L does not intend to disclose the self-dealing to E or to the
court. If G refuses to heed L's advice, L plans to secure the removal of
G, still without consulting E or disclosing G's self-dealing to the court.78
Empathic Analysis
Protection of a client's confidences is a basic premise of the attorney-
client relationship; however, that premise may be weakened or overcome
by an attorney's other duties and responsibilities. Foremost, the attorney
cannot allow a fraud to be committed upon a tribunal. 79 That does not
seem a danger here. G has made no attempt to conceal his self-dealing.
Thus, L's duty to maintain G's confidences does not appear jeopardized
by L's duty of candor toward the court.
In addition to the duty toward the court, L owes some duty of care to
E, the derivative client.8 0 His representation of G is in a fiduciary rela-
tion with E. L's failure to adequately consider E's interests could expose
77. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Dec. C-778
(1964). While there is little case law dealing specifically with the guardian-ward relation-
ship, the general rule is that the primary representation is of the fiduciary as fiduciary.
See, e-g., Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1491 (11th Cir. 1991) (corporate counsel);
Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (executor); Neal v. Baker,
551 N.E.2d 704, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (trustee); In re Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051,
1054 (Wash. 1985) (personal representative). But see Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Advisory
Ops. on Prof. Conduct, Op. 91-24, in 80 Ill. B.J. 374 (1992) (holding that guardian had
no reasonable expectation of representation or confidentiality when making disclosure to
ward's long-time attorney).
78. This example is based on illustration 1.14:303 in the Hazard & Hodes handbook
on the Model Rules. See I Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering § 1.14:303 (2d ed. 1992).
79. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 3.3; see also Restatement, supra note 8,§ 132.
80. In certain types of representation, as when the attorney represents a fiduciary, a
third-party must be recognized as constructively present, even though the third party is
not actually a client. As beneficiary of the representation, the third-party does not stand
at arm's length from the attorney-client relationship. This "derivative client" requires
the lawyer to be more attentive in seeing that the actual goals of the representation are
being properly carried out. See Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington
Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906, 909 (D.D.C. 1982) (attorney for the trustees of an employee
benefit plan owed duty to beneficiaries equal to that owed the trustee-clients); Hazard &
Hodes, supra note 78, at § 1.3:108.
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L to both ethical and practical problems."1
L should consider several factors when deciding whether his duties
toward both G and E can continue to be met. Have E's interests in fact
been harmed? How blameworthy was G's conduct? Can such future
conduct be prevented?82
In this fairly simple situation, L may be able to maintain G's confi-
dence without terminating the relationship.83 L should certainly consult
with G, and remind G of the responsibilities and limitations of G's au-
thority. L should also urge G to take any appropriate remedial action
and to make no attempts to conceal this transgression. So long as G
attempts no fraudulent action, L should be able to continue his represen-
tation.84 Nevertheless, L's ability to continue at this juncture rests on the
assumption that there has been no fraud, rather than no harm.
Autonomic Analysis
L's representation of G, a guardian who is engaged in non-fraudulent
self-dealing which has not depleted E's estate, raises an interesting quan-
dary because of concerns regarding whom (i.e., the guardian or the ward)
the lawyer represents. L was engaged by and is paid by G, but his work
is ultimately for the benefit of E. Thus, a useful autonomy principle must
be sensitive to the need to protect the interests of both G and E.85
The ideal principle would recognize that L's duty is owed primarily to
E and only derivatively to G. 6 Although the immediate impact of such
81. See Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (allowing suc-
cessor conservator to bring action against former conservator's attorney, despite lack of
privity; lawyer could be liable for former conservator's misconduct despite absence of
fraud or collusion between conservator and lawyer).
82. See id. at 990. Any previous relation between L and E, especially if longstanding,
also may be factored in; such a relationship may increase L's duty of loyalty to E and
hasten L's decision to withdraw from representing G. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
Advisory Ops. on Prof. Conduct, Op. 91-24, in 80 111. B.J. 374, 374 (1992) (holding that
guardian had no reasonable expectation of representation when disclosing to ward's long-
time attorney); In re Fraser, 523 P.2d 921, 928 (Wash. 1974) (holding attorney correct in
refusing to withdraw at guardian's request until appropriate replacement had been found;
attorney had represented ward for extended period before appointment of current
guardian).
83. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 78, § 1.2:510 (agreeing that lawyer may assist
client in undoing harm that is neither criminal nor fraudulent without disclosure).
84. Virtually all ethics opinions, regardless of what final action is recommended, ad-
vise this period of consultation and remonstration, giving the fiduciary an opportunity to
rectify any wrongs. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. C-778 (1964) (self-dealing guardian); General Counsel of the Ala. State
Bar, Op. 89-105, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:1061 (holding lawyer should at-
tempt to convince fiduciary client to repair wrongdoing before withdrawing).
The purpose of a guardianship is to preserve the ward's assets for the ward's own use
and enjoyment. See, e.g., In re Michelson's Guardianship, 111 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wash.
1941). L's representation of G is to assist G in that goal. While G is acting as a fiduciary,
and not acting illegally, L's representation should continue.
85. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
86. This suggestion differs from the prevailing rule, where L's duty would be deemed
to run to G, instead of E.
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an analysis would be to subordinate G's interest, in the long run it would
have the effect of elevating the interests of both G and E. Holding L
ultimately accountable to E, and thereby requiring that L disclose all
relevant information, would impose on L the responsibility to act to
carry out a fiduciary relationship of the highest order and at all times
require L to justify any departure from G's instruction. Thus, a decision
by L which appears justified in the absence of a contrary recommenda-
tion by G may well look less reasonable in the face of a conflicting rec-
ommendation by G. More practically, should G have objections, G's
remedy should be a malpractice suit against L-a malpractice suit in
which, on the facts, G will be hard-pressed to establish damages.
As regards our hypothetically self-dealing G, therefore, the duty that
we posit L owes to E requires, at a minimum, that G be convinced to
rescind the subject transaction, and ordinarily requires that, if G is recal-
citrant, L tell E (or an appropriate regulatory official) about G's trans-
gression. L would, however, have leeway in some circumstances not to
report the matter to E. If E is too weak physically or psychologically to
receive the information, L need not report.
b. Guardian's Self-Dealing Has Caused Loss; Guardian Has Promised
To Make Good
Same as example C. 1.a, except that G's self-dealing has caused loss to
E's estate. G, however, has promised to make good the loss.
Empathic Analysis
Here, L's dilemma sharpens considerably. E's interests have been im-
paired, at least temporarily, and the repair of those interests may be in
some doubt. Given the realities of the guardian role (which requires judi-
cial approval for most transactions), G may already have entangled both
himself and L in fraud.
Ethics opinions tend to regard such borderline situations as, at most,
requiring the discretion of the attorney; one opinion goes so far as to
recommend that no attorney be disciplined for the choice he makes in
this difficult situation.87 L's own knowledge and insight will be impor-
tant. G remains a client and, as of yet, G may not have done any acts
serious enough to justify disclosure or withdrawal by L. How trustwor-
thy is (3? Will G in fact make good? Can G be counted on to be candid
regarding this and other transactions? Does G have some relationship
with E that makes continuing the guardianship (and L's facilitating that
continuation) desirable?88
87. See Wisconsin State Bar Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. E-89-9, in National Rep. on
Legal Ethics and Prof. Resp. WI:OPINIONS:8 (1989) [hereinafter Nat'l Rep.].
88. A settlor can choose his trustees, a testatrix her executors, but a ward rarely has
any input into the choice of a guardian. Nevertheless, given prevailing statutory provi-
sions and the usual preference for choosing close relatives, the guardian is likely to be
someone well known to the ward. Some states are experimenting with giving wards
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L's duty of confidentiality toward G indicates some measure of tem-
perance here. L should certainly confront G and urge G to make good
the losses and to be candid in any dealings with the court. L should
probably also give G some time to rectify the situation. 9
Autonomic Analysis
G's promise to make restitution is irrelevant. Since the facts state that
G's self-dealing has, in fact, caused harm to E's estate, L's duty is to
report.
L's fiduciary duty requires that rescission and restitution be pursued,
but L should not accept restitution based on an agreement to keep silent
about G's acts. If G is not an attorney, L's silence saves G at the cost of
putting other, if any, of G's wards at risk. If G is an attorney, the result
would be compounded; a failure to report would, in addition, undermine
the lawyer discipline process. 90
One interesting twist is that G may argue that the attorney-client privi-
lege protects him from L's disclosure. Depending upon the timing of the
disclosure, G is not privileged to communicate with L for purposes of
carrying out a criminal enterprise.9'
c. Guardian's Self-Dealing Has Caused Loss; No Promise to Make
Good; Express Request for Confidentiality
G's self-dealing has caused loss to E's estate. G has admitted the self-
dealing to L. G has no plans to make good the loss, and G expressly
requests L to treat the information as confidential. 92
greater input, such as allowing for pre-selection of guardians (along with pre-exclusion).
See Gerry W. Beyer, Enhancing Self-Determination Through Guardian Self-Declaration,
23 Ind. L. Rev. 71 (1990). Regardless of local statutory provisions, L may wish to con-
sider relations between G and E when considering any change in the representation of G.
See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 78, at § 1.14:303.
89. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. C-778
(1964).
90. "A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appro-
priate professional authority." Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 8.3(a); cf Model Code,
supra note 13, DR 1-103(A).
91. See Clark v. State, 261 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855
(1953) (holding that attorney's telephone inquiry of client regarding whether client had
disposed of murder weapon was not privileged communication, because its goal was to
further commission of crime).
92. Examples C.l.a and C.l.b did not specify how L learned of G's self-dealing. The
method of transmission makes no difference when considering L's ethical responsibilities,
unless G's actions were of such a public nature that no presumption of confidentiality
would attach. L has an ethical responsibility to protect all of G's confidences and secrets
relating to the representation, regardless of how L learned of them. See Model Rules,
supra note 13, Rule 1.6; Restatement, supra note 8, § 112, cmt. c. L's method of learning
of G's transgressions may affect his decision to continue, disclose, or withdraw; L may be
justified in giving greater latitude to a fiduciary who readily admits misconduct.
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Empathic Analysis
At this point L must take some action; a failure to act would expose L
to a malpractice claim on E's behalf, in addition to raising ethical
problems.93 L may choose to withdraw from the representation, to dis-
close G's transgressions, or both to withdraw and to disclose. Given that
an attorney should withdraw when continuing the representation in-
volves assisting the client in wrongdoing, withdrawal seems
unavoidable.94
Court decisions lean toward disclosure.95 Opinions stress the court's
natural preference for more disclosure rather than less as necessary in the
search for truth, and the attorney's responsibility to be candid and to
prevent fraud.96 The candor toward tribunals exception to the otherwise
stringent confidentiality requirement of Model Rule 1.6 is grounded pri-
marily on the need to protect the integrity of the adversarial system;97
however, the duty extends to nonadversarial proceedings as well.9
Ethics opinions tend to favor nondisclosure accompanied by with-
drawal.99 A significant number of the collected state ethics opinions,
93. See Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988, 990 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
94. The lawyer cannot allow his services to be used to perpetrate or conceal a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act. Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 3.3(a), (b), 8.4; Model Code,
supra note 13, DR 7-102(A)(7); Restatement, supra note 8, § 44(2)(a) (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 1992). The withdrawal and disclosure thresholds may not be the same; under the
Model Rules, a lawyer could not assist in any criminal or fraudulent act, but could dis-
close only if the act were likely to cause imminent death or serious bodily injury or if a
fraud were being committed on a tribunal.
95. See e.g., Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (requir-
ing disclosure to probate court on lawyer's learning of trustees' incompetent and fraudu-
lent management); In re Glenos' Estate, 200 N.E.2d 65, 67 (I11. App. Ct. 1964) (holding it
proper for attorney for estate to join in removal petition as officer of the court).
96. "[E]ven worse than the attorney's misappropriation of his client's funds was his
fraudulent and contrived misrepresentation." Olguin v. State Bar of California, 616 P.2d
858, 861 (Cal. 1980).
97. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 3.3 cmt. 1.
98. See, eg., In re Estate of Minsky, 376 N.E.2d 647, 650 (111. App. Ct. 1978) (attor-
ney for executor has obligation to inform probate court of suspected fraud by the
executor).
99. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. C 778 (1964) (holding it
improper for attorney to disclose or to seek removal of misappropriating guardian); Gen-
eral Counsel of the Alabama State Bar, Op. 89-105, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at
901:1061 (1989) (absconding executor); General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar, Op.
89-77, in ABAIBNA, supra note 16, at 901:1057 (1989) (clear evidence of guardian's
conversion); Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-12, in
Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at IL:OPINIONS:9 (1990) (duty of candor does not transcend
confidentiality); Ethics Comm. of the Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 422, in
Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at CA:OPINIONS:72-73 (1989) (embezzling guardian); New
York County Lawyers' Association, Op. 616 (1973), in Olavi Maru, 1975 Supplement to
the Digest of Bar Association Ethics Opinions 366 (1977) (holding that if executors may
be committing fraud, attorney should advise disclosure but is not obliged to make disclo-
sure on own); Legal Ethics Comm. of the Oregon State Bar, Op. 1991-119, in 1991 WL
279210 (personal representative); Legal Ethics Comm. of the Oregon State Bar, Op.
1991-62, in 1991 WL 279129 (personal representative); Ethics Advisory Panel of the
Rhode Island Sup. Ct., Op. 91-65, in Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at RI:OPINIONS:7
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however, were issued after 1980, and the trend against disclosure may be
influenced by the appearance of the Model Rules and the primacy of
Model Rule 1.6, whose exceptions to the confidentiality rule are not eas-
ily applicable to estate planning situations."° Even where disclosure is
recommended, ethics opinions stress that the recommendation is still
subject to the attorney's discretion, 10 1 and that any disclosure should be
as limited as possible.'02
The split between court decisions and ethics opinions is difficult to ex-
plain. Ethics opinions rarely touch on the duty of candor to the court
imposed by Model Rule 3.3;1o3 the assumption may be that the attorney
can withdraw before actually being implicated in any fraud.)" As has
(1991) (stressing importance of Model Rule 1.6 in guardian's questionable withdrawal of
funds); Wisconsin State Bar Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. E-89-9, in Nat'l Rep., supra
note 87, at WI:OPINIONS:8 (1989) (putting special emphasis on value of attorney's dis-
cretion in doubts about fraudulent nature of fiduciary's actions).
A primary/derivative client relationship is present in each of the foregoing opinions,
but that relationship seems to have little influence on the outcome. Under Model Rule
1.6, with its limited disclosure exception (death or serious injury), withdrawal without
disclosure would seem to be the recommended action for any attorney whose client was
considering a fraudulent action. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.6. A greater
awareness of the primary/derivative client relationship may explain why Professors Haz-
ard and Hodes reach a different conclusion when confronting this problem, recom-
mending action to remove the primary client even before any fraudulent activity has
occurred; their analysis places a greater emphasis on the best interests of the derivative
client and less on the confidentiality owed the primary client. Hazard & Hodes, supra
note 78, at § 1.14:303.
A combination of factors-Fickett-type liability, Hazard and Hodes's interpretation of
Model Rule 1.14 duties, and more relaxed disclosure requirements under the Restate-
ment-may suggest that in the future the withdrawal, no-disclosure rule will no longer be
an appropriate response in the primary/derivative situation. Restatement, supra note 8,
§ 117B cmt. b (allowing disclosure for prospective fraud likely to cause serious injury to
other's financial interests justified by consideration of "important rights of third parties").
See also Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); ACTEC Com-
mentaries, supra note 8, at 45; Christopher H. Gadsden, American Bar Ass'n Real Prop-
erty Probate and Trust Law Section, Special Committee on Professional Responsibility:
Counseling the Fiduciary 30-31 (Draft 6/10/93) (draft on file with the Fordham Law
Review). The Gadsden Report, prepared for the same committee as the Hilker Report,
see supra note 8, was approved by the Council of the ABA Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law Section. See Section News, Prob. & Prop., Jan./Feb. 1994, at 4. Both the
ACTEC Commentaries and Gadsden rely on the "impliedly authorized" language in
Model Rule 1.6 to justify disclosures to derivative clients; Gadsden also draws a parallel
between the primary/derivative situation and the representation of an entity (Model Rule
1.13), where the duty of confidentiality to a constituent may yield to protecting the inter-
ests of the entity.
100. See Pennell, supra note 15, at "441.
101. See New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 591 (1987), in ABA/BNA,
supra note 16, at 901:5803-04 (1990) ("borrowings" by estate administrator). Pennell,
supra note 15, at *400, points out that withdrawal itself may be a form of disclosure.
102. See Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Prof. Guidance Comm., Op. 89-4, in Nat'l Rep.,
supra note 87, at PA:OPINIONS:64, 65 (1990) (ongoing fraud).
103. See Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-12, in Nat'l
Rep., supra note 87, at IL:OPINIONS:8, 9 (1990) (holding that duty of confidentiality
takes precedence over duty of candor).
104. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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been noted, a withdrawal itself, however quietly accomplished, may be a
form of disclosure. Additionally, these ethics opinions are intended only
as guidelines, while the cases deal with actual situations (and actual pen-
alties). While the decision to withdraw seems clear-cut, L must weigh
carefully the nature of G's infraction and how it is being committed,
when determining whether disclosure to the court is necessary."o
Disclosure to E is another matter altogether. L has a duty to the court
as well as an ethical responsibility to limit any disclosure as much as
possible. L's duty to E in this situation is unclear, given that E is not the
primary client.106 L's fiduciary-like duties to E may extend only so far as
to prevent L from assisting G in damaging E's interests, but not so far as
to disclose G's secrets.' 0 7
Autonomic Analysis
The answer here would be the same as for C.1.b, since restitution is
irrelevant and confidentiality inapposite.
2. Representation of Guardian Who Has Imprudently Invested
Same as example C. .a, except that G's conduct is not self-dealing but
imprudent investment. G consults L regarding the consequences of in-
vesting E's estate in commodity futures. L advises G that local law does
not allow the investment, even as to a portion of the estate. Contrary to
L's advice, G invests a portion of E's estate in commodity futures. The
investment suffers a substantial loss.
In preparing the annual accounting to the court for the guardianship,
L discovers G's investment and subsequent loss. G asks L to prepare the
accounting in a way that will disguise the investment and loss. Assume
that L may not prepare the misleading accounting, and that L refuses to
do so. G prepares a misleading accounting and orders L to keep G's
actions in confidence. Must L disclose G's conduct to E or to E's family
or to the court? May L disclose G's conduct? Must L resign from repre-
105. If L makes the decision to disclose, may he maintain a relation with E, even if that
requires taking a position adverse to G? At least one ethics opinion holds that a lawyer,
after representing a conservator, may represent the ward in a removal action if no confi-
dential information will be used. This ethics opinion found that the prior representation
of the conservator and the removal action were not "substantially related." Ethics
Comm. of the Mississippi State Bar, Op. 90 (1984), ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at
801:5106 (1984).
106. But see Gadsden, supra note 99, at 39 (disclosure to beneficiaries is preferred and
disclosure to court is a "last resort" when informing beneficiaries would not be effective
(for example, beneficiary is a minor)).
107. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 78, at § 1.14:303, for example, leaves the question of
disclosure to the ward to the attorney's discretion. The guardian/ward situation is some-
what different from other primary/derivative client situations, given that the derivative
client is already under some form of handicap. L's decision to disclose to E would have
to take into consideration how much or how little knowledge L has of E's mental and
emotional capacities. See Gadsden, supra note 99, at 10 n.9 (describing the "negative"
definition of duty owed to the derivative client).
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senting G? May L resign?108
Empathic Analysis
While this situation begins differently-G is imprudent, rather than
calculating-the end will be indistinguishable from C. 1.c. L cannot be a
party to submitting the fraudulent accounting to the court. As in C. 1.c, L
should withdraw from the representation of G. If G has not yet perpe-
trated a fraud by presenting the misleading accounting, L may be ab-
solved of any disclosure duties to the court or to E. 0 9
Autonomic Analysis
Where "G asks L to prepare the accounting in a way that will disguise
the investment and loss," the autonomy principle is directly implicated.
Lawyers are forbidden from lying because deceit robs those who must
rely on the representation of an appropriate opportunity to assess risk
and to act accordingly. Moreover, when the purpose of a conversation is
to counsel commission of a crime, it is not privileged. °
Under the circumstances, L must disclose G's conduct to the court.
Ideally L would not disclose to E's family, for that would undermine E's
autonomy.
3. Representation of Attorney-in-Fact
a. Lawyer Retained by Attorney-in-Fact
In this example we assume that, instead of acting as a guardian, G is
the attorney-in-fact for E under a durable power of attorney prepared by
E's former lawyer, M, who is now dead. L was retained by G to advise G
regarding his powers and duties as attorney-in-fact.
Empathic Analysis
Disclosure of an attorney-in-fact's misconduct is complicated by the
nature of the power of attorney itself. In most states, the attorney-in-fact
can operate without court supervision."' Thus L would be unable to
108. This example is based on example 1.6-1(1) of the Commentaries on the Model
Rules prepared by Professor Price for the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
See ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 8, at 42.
109. See supra note 87 for some opinions suggesting withdrawal with no disclosure.
But cf Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236 (Ct. App. 1991) (suggesting that L should
have reported G's imprudent investing to the court; distinguishable, however, because
case involved both imprudence and self-dealing, along with serious misconduct by the
attorney); Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (involving the
attorney's failure to discover the conservator's misconduct; case does not reach the ques-
tion of whether withdrawal would have protected the attorney from liability, or at what
point the attorney's special relation with the ward would have required the attorney to
divulge the conservator's confidences).
110. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (counseling to commit crime not
privileged).
111. See infra example B.2.
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justify any breach of confidence by referring to an attorney's duty of can-
dor to a tribunal.'
12
Autonomic Analysis
L's involvement as counsel to the person with a fiduciary obligation to
E, under whatever name (e.g., trustee, guardian, attorney-in-fact, special
agent), ultimately must be reducible to a duty to E. Only such a descrip-
tion assures vindication of a public policy which views E's autonomy as
the law's central theme. Accordingly, L's duty is in the first instance to
advise G and in the second to assure that E is protected.' 1 3
b. Attorney-in-Fact has Imprudently Invested
This example is a variation on example C.2.a. L represents G as attor-
ney-in-fact for E under a durable power of attorney prepared by E's for-
mer lawyer, M, who is now dead. In reviewing G's records as attorney-
in-fact, L learns that G invested part of E's estate in commodity futures,
contrary to local law, and that as a result E's estate suffered a substantial
loss. L's investment advice to G had been proper. Assume that L had no
duty to determine whether G made investments contrary to L's advice.
Must L disclose G's conduct to E or to E's family or to the court? May
L disclose G's conduct? Must L resign from representing G? May L
resign?114
Empathic Analysis
At least one source suggests that L may at least recommend that E's
family seek independent counsel." 5 L's further course of action may de-
pend on local rules. How would G's violation of local law be classified?
112. This situation, and the others dealing with powers of attorney, are perhaps the
most difficult of the primary/derivative client situations. While lawyers representing
other fiduciaries, such as trustees and guardians, will be able to justify at least some
disclosures because of court supervision, the lawyer representing an attorney-in-fact will
rarely have access to that justification. Instead, any decision to disclose will have to be
based on a finding of affirmative obligations implicitly arising from the duty owed to the
derivative client (even though that duty is generally expressed in negative, rather than
affirmative, terms) or, alternatively, based on the "impliedly authorized" language in
Model Rule 1.6.
If L were to decide that disclosure of G's actions was justified, to whom should L
disclose? Professors Hazard and Hodes and Mr. Gadsden, while recommending disclo-
sure of fiduciary misconduct, envision disclosure to a party already involved in the rela-
tionship-the court or the beneficiaries. Disclosure to a member of E's family is stepping
outside the boundaries of the primary/derivative client situation. See Hazard & Hodes,
supra note 78, at 1.3:108, 1.14:102, 1.14:301; Gadsden, supra note 99, at 30-39.
113. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (L has duty to report client-fiduci-
ary's misconduct, but is subject to a malpractice suit).
114. This example is based on example 1.6-1(2) of the ACTEC Commentaries. See
ACTEC Commentaries, supra note 8, at 42.
115. Id Such a suggestion may be especially valuable in those states where certain
parties are allowed to request court supervision for powers of attorney, but it also comes
at least as close to a disclosure as any withdrawal might. However, the hypothetical
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Is it sufficiently serious to invoke some other disclosure exception? As to
withdrawal, L is probably not obligated to withdraw, but may be well
advised to do so.' 1
6
Autonomic Analysis
Consistent with the autonomy principle summarized in the preceding
discussion, L must disclose G's conduct to someone; the only question is
whether disclosure to the family or to the court would be most
reasonable.
The analysis begins, however, with recognition that issues concerning
E's autonomy run first to E, himself, and then to the court. Disclosures
by L to E do not represent breaches of trust, since L stands in a fiduciary
relation to E even while serving as G's attorney.'17 Except for E, the
court more than any other source of oversight has the interest, power,
and independence to frame solutions that will protect E's autonomy. Ac-
cordingly, next to E the court should be viewed as the primary source for
referrals of wrongdoing. Disclosure to the family may well result in a
referral to the court, but is also more likely to introduce pressures for
negotiated settlements even when compromises may be inconsistent with
the general public interest.
If matters reach a point where L must make disclosures, L must with-
draw from the representation of G.
4. Representation of Guardian After Long Representation of Ward
In the preceding examples, assume that, instead of initially being re-
involved a trustee, rather than an attorney-in-fact, and thus the beneficiaries would be
derivative clients.
116. G's actions may not require withdrawal as per Model Rule 1.16, but, in represent-
ing a fiduciary, L's duties to the derivative client require that L take no part in assisting a
fiduciary breach. See supra note 94.
117. Despite the absence of an explicit derivative client relationship between L and G,
in policy terms the situation is analogous to that faced by the court in Riggs National
Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1976). In Zimmer beneficiaries of a trust
sought a memorandum prepared by the trustee's lawyer over the lawyer's claim of privi-
lege. In concluding that the memorandum should be released, the court's analysis was in
classic autonomic terms:
This is not a simple case of a single client communicating with his attorney to
obtain legal assistance but presents a situation which involves the rights of other
parties as well. Thus .... whether or not disclosure of the document in question
should be allowed ... must be determined in light of the purpose for which it
was prepared, and the party or parties for whose benefit it was procured, in
relation to what litigation was then pending or threatened. If it is determined
that the beneficiaries were ultimately the persons intended to benefit from the
legal assistance requested and the memorandum . . . [then] the issue of the
asserted right to inspect the document against the defensive claim of privileges
comes into clearer focus.
Id. at 711. More briefly stated, therefore, such determinations should always be made in
light of what is most likely to enhance the ultimate beneficiary's ability to exercise his or
her options.
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tained by G, L was for many years the lawyer for E, doing E's estate
planning and other legal work. After E became incompetent, L was re-
tained by G to advise G as guardian or attorney-in-fact.
Empathic Analysis
Here, there is a question as to whether E is still L's client. Theoreti-
cally, L could continue to represent E and represent G as attorney-in-fact
as well.118 Under such a joint representation, information relating to G's
actions as attorney-in-fact would not necessarily be protected from dis-
closure to E.119 Given L's previous (perhaps continuing) relationship
with E, L would seem justified in at least withdrawing from representing
G, while still representing E.
Autonomic Analysis
Inclusion of the additional facts (i.e., that L was for many years the
lawyer for E who was retained by G to advise G as guardian or attorney-
in-fact) does not change the results announced in C.3.a. The new facts
do, however, raise the question whether it was appropriate for L to repre-
sent G, when L was already representing E. Assuming that there were
no existing unresolved conflicts,1 20 there is no reason why L ought not to
join with G in serving the interest of E.
If, and when, a conflict between E and G arises (as in the case of im-
pending or completed fraud or imprudent supervision by G), L must dis-
close to G and withdraw from the representation.1 2 1
D. Client Under a Possible Disability
This section covers issues that arise when lawyers represent clients that
may be under a physical, mental, or legal disability. The section includes
hypotheticals dealing with the confidentiality of medical information re-
lating to a possibly incompetent client, disclosure to guardians of clients
118. See Gadsden, supra note 99, at 21 (arguing that a lawyer may represent both a
fiduciary and a beneficiary, since in most cases both parties will have a common goal-
the fiulfillment of the settlor's wishes). It follows that a lawyer may represent both a
principal and an attorney-in-fact, and especially a guardian and a ward, since their goals
should be even closer-the maximizing of the ward's estate for the ward's own use and
enjoyment.
119. If E were in fact incompetent, however, this would not be very meaningful. In
each of the foregoing power of attorney representations, L may wish to consider institut-
ing guardianship proceedings for E, and thus bring management of E's estate under court
supervision. Such action of itself poses disclosure problems. In C.3.a and C.3.b, L may
simply not know enough about E's condition, and thus petitioning for a guardian may
itself be a disclosure, as would a withdrawal in some circumstances, of G's confidences.
In C.4, L, who has represented E in the past, is more likely to have the necessary infor-
mation, but L may also know that E opted for a power of attorney just to avoid the cost
and embarrassment of guardianship proceedings. See McGovern, supra note 67, at 18.
See also infra example D.2.a et seq. (illustrating disclosure problems and incompetency).
120. See infra example D.2.
121. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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under a legal judgment of incompetency, representation of a client who
appears incompetent, and representation of a client who requests a radi-
cal change in his or her testamentary plans. 22
1. Disclosure of Medical Information
a. Disclosure of Recent Medical Exam; Client Refuses to Consent to
Disclosure
For many years, L represented E, who is now elderly. L did E's estate
planning and other legal work. E's recent behavior, as observed by L,
has seemed erratic and inconsistent with E's behavior as L has observed
it over the years. L is concerned that E may be incompetent and unable
to manage her affairs. In the course of his representation of E, L learns
that E has recently undergone a medical examination. L contacts E's
physician and requests her opinion of E's competency, based on the re-
cent medical examination. E instructs the physician not to disclose her
medical information to L. May E's physician disclose patient informa-
tion to L?
Empathic Analysis
Physicians, like attorneys, owe a duty of fiduciary confidentiality to
their patients.'23 Breach of that confidence can have legal conse-
quences.' 24 As with the attorney-client privilege, the privilege belongs
not to the professional but to the client-patient, and only the client-pa-
tient can waive the privilege.125 If E refuses disclosure, L should expect
122. One commentator offers the following options as the universe of choices available
to attorneys dealing with possibly incompetent clients:
(1) Follow the client's wishes as if the client were competent;
(2) Seek a guardian for the client, either directly or through referral;
(3) Rely on the next of kin as proxy decisionmaker, but without seeking prior court
approval of the decisionmaker;
(4) Act as de facto guardian (which the commentator notes is acting without actual
authority);
(5) Deviate from conventional interaction by seeking to persuade the client to permit
the attorney to do what he or she thinks a more "realistic" client would choose (which is
essentially a variation on the "substitution of judgment" option, where the attorney tries
to determine the "judgment" of a normal client, rather than determining what the actual
client would decide if more lucid); or
(6) Withdraw from the representation. See Paul R. Tremblay, On Persuasion and Pa-
ternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH
L. REV. 515, 553.
123. See Petrillo v. Syntex Lab. Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
("[M]odern public policy strongly favors the confidential and fiduciary relationship ex-
isting between a patient and his physician.").
124. See Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 536 (Or. 1985) (holding
actionable a doctor's disclosure of confidential adoption information).
125. Physicians are required to disclose some information, for example to government
agencies. But it has been strenuously recommended that, where possible litigation is in-
volved, physicians respond only to court orders and only through formal discovery chan-
nels. See Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 968.
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the physician to honor that refusal.' 26
A utonomid Analysis
That the autonomy principle asserted here as the raison d'etre of the
attorney-client relationship has its counterpart in other professional rela-
tionships12 7 lies behind L's hypothetical request to E's physician for dis-
closure of E's medical condition. E's consultation with her physician,
like her consultation with L, must be understood as an act of empower-
ment by and for E that is personal and exclusive. Based on medical (or
legal) advice, E may deem it in her self-interest to empower others with
the information received, but any resulting dissemination of the informa-
tion must also be viewed as an expression of E's autonomy. It follows,
therefore, that without E's authorization, L is no more entitled to infor-
mation from E's physician about their consultations than the physician
would be entitled to consultative information from L's meetings with E.
b. Disclosure of Recent Medical Exam; Client Consents to Disclosure
Same as example D.l.a, except that E has consented to disclosure of
her patient information. May E's physician disclose patient information
to L?
Empathic Analysis
As noted, the waiver of the physician-patient privilege is at the pa-
tient's discretion. As in D. 1.a, L can expect the physician to honor E's
decision to disclose.1 28
Autonomic Analysis
Yes, E's physician may disclose patient information to L. As in the
case of the attorney-client privilege, when E has consented to disclosure
by her physician to L, the confidentiality of patient information is waived
for that narrow purpose. Accordingly a waiver by E would normally be
sufficient to authorize L's access to patient/doctor confidences. The in-
stant hypothetical raises a limiting consideration, however: If E is, in
126. Medical ethics, and statutes that delineate the legal limits of the physician-patient
privilege, allow a physician to disclose to protect the patient or society at large. If the
physician felt that E was a danger to himself, the physician might feel that disclosure,
leading to appropriate protective action, would be permissible. See Robert M. Gellman,
Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Pri-
vacy, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 255, 281-87 (1984).
127. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (physicians as fiduciaries).
128. A caveat: physicians, like attorneys, must consider the quality of E's consent:
has E been properly informed of the possible consequences and is E competent to con-
sent? See John R. Murphy, Older Clients of Questionable Competency: Making Accurate
Competency Determinations Through the Utilization of Medical Professionals, 4 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 899, 914-16 (1991). The physician may be in a better position to judge E's
competency to consent, and the physician can also justify disclosure on the "best inter-
ests" grounds.
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fact, non compos mentis, then her waiver in favor of L is not sufficient to
constitute a waiver of the doctor/patient confidence.
129
Ideally, the doctor would have taken pains to assure that E identified
persons able to act during E's incapacity. Failure to do so may well con-
stitute malpractice on the doctor's part. In the absence of such precau-
tions, however, if E is incompetent the physician would violate the
autonomy principle by releasing information to L. From the physician's
standpoint, L is a stranger to E and strangers ought not to be allowed to
interfere with a patient's use of a doctor to preserve autonomy. More-
over, as E's attorney, L had it within his authority to draft agreements
authorizing him to act in E's behalf in designated situations. Here, too,
the absence of such an agreement may well constitute malpractice.
c. Medical Exam Taken at Lawyer's Request
Same as example D.l.a, except that E has not had a recent medical
examination. L suggests to E (and properly so) that she undergo an ex-
amination. E agrees to the examination. May E's physician disclose in-
formation about the examination to L? 130
Empathic Analysis
If E goes to a new physician at L's request, the confidentiality of the
exam is uncertain. Does a physician-patient relationship arise when the
physician examines the patient solely for potential litigation?131 Does the
sharing of the exam results render the information non-confidential?' 32
Autonomic Analysis
Here, too, the governing consideration is whether E has competently
authorized her physician to disclose her medical records. If so, E's phy-
sician may make such disclosures of E's medical records as would be
consistent with E's authorization, including disclosure of the information
to L. Although questions about the confidentiality of E's medical infor-
mation might arise if E's medical exam were conducted in preparation
129. See id. at 915 (doctor must weigh patient's capacity to waive privilege).
130. See id.; Michael Gilfix & Peter J. Strauss, New Age Estate Planning: The Emer-
gence of Elder Law, Tr. & Est., Apr. 1988, at 14, 30.
131. See City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 28 (Cal.
1951) (holding that when purpose is only examination, not treatment, no physician-pa-
tient relationship is created).
132. This may depend on local discovery rules and at what stage the exam occurs.
City & County of San Francisco suggests that the physician is in fact a communicating
agent between client and attorney, and all information is thus covered by attorney-client
privilege, not physician-patient. See id. at 29-30. For the hazards of requesting medical
records when litigation is brewing, see Rea v. Pardo, 522 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396-98 (App.
Div. 1987) (holding that release was a sign that litigation was possible and that release of
records to a potentially adverse party was not breach of confidence after lower court held
that merely requesting release of records to lawyer, when litigation had not yet begun, did
not waive confidentiality).
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for trial,13 3 the facts here present the medical exam as overdue and,
although with L's prompting, conducted in the regular course of medical
care.
d. Client Consents to Physician Disclosure; Client Found To Be
Incompetent
Same as example D.l.a, except that E has consented to her physician's
disclosure of her medical information, and the physician discloses it to L.
Based on the information, L concludes that E is incompetent. May L
disclose the medical information to E's family? To the court?"3
Empathic Analysis
An apparent prior relation between the physician and E distinguishes
this scenario from D.I.c, where mere disclosure between the communi-
cating agent and L would not render the information non-confidential.
Even so, the physician's disclosure to L would not seem sufficient to re-
move this disclosure from the realm of confidential information. 35 E's
consent does not seem to extend to wider disclosure and, even if it did,
E's competency to make that consent is now doubtful. 36 Accordingly,
L's authority to disclose must be based on some grounds other than E's
consent or the fact of the physician's compliance with E's request.' 37
Autonomic Analysis
Assuming the authorized disclosure of information by E's physician to
L,131 what further disclosure L may make of the information is problem-
atic. The specific terms of that waiver will determine the scope of its use.
Absent clearly articulated limits on the disclosure, the scope of L's use of
the information must be deemed to be limited to purposes reasonably
necessary to accomplish the legal representation for which L received the
waiver.139 Whether L may disclose medical information to E's family or
the court, therefore, requires a contextual determination. As a general
rule, however, genuinely ambiguous issues ought always to be referable
to a court (or an appropriate ethics advisory body) for resolution, since
133. See supra note 131.
134. See Linda F. Smith, Representing the Elderly Client and Addressing the Question
of Competence, 14 J. Contemp. L. 61, 100 (1988); Jacqueline Allee, Representing Older
Persons: Ethical Dilemmas, Prob. & Prop., Jan./Feb. 1988, at 37, 40.
135. The distinction might matter if attorney-client privilege alone were involved. But
to meet ethical standards of non-confidentiality, the information would have to be readily
attainable through public sources.
136. See supra note 119 (mental capacity to waive confidentiality).
137. For a fuller discussion of those possible grounds, see supra note 126.
138. L's belief that E is incompetent to authorize disclosure of her medical records
may be dispositive, see supra note 128 and accompanying text, but need not necessarily be
so. If notwithstanding L's medical diagnosis, E is, in fact, competent, that ought to gov-
ern. At that stage, the issue becomes one of the scope of the waiver.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 132-33 (scope of disclosure).
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courts are neutral stakeholders. In contrast, disclosure to family mem-
bers is prohibited in the absence of explicit authorization because of the
risks to E's autonomy. 14°
2. Client Under Legal Judgment of Incompetency
a. Guardian Wants Lawyer to Disclose Estate Plan That Lawyer
Prepared for Ward
For many years, L represented E (now elderly), did E's estate plan-
ning, and did other legal work for E. E became of doubtful competency
and E's family sought an adjudication of incompetency and the appoint-
ment of a guardian for E's person and estate. At E's request, L opposed
the family's petition. E was adjudicated an incompetent and G was ap-
pointed as guardian. L is in possession of E's estate planning records
including E's will (which was executed while E was competent). E's fam-
ily had previously been advised by E that E had made a will and that L
was E's lawyer. G asks L to deliver E's estate planning records or at
least to disclose the contents of E's will to G.
Empathic Analysis
Proper resolution may depend on the nature of the guardianship and
of the plans involved. At least one ethics opinion counsels against turn-
ing over or revealing the contents of E's will to a guardian, although
another opinion differentiates between the rights of a conservator and the
rights of a guardian.14" ' In some jurisdictions a conservator-most often
with a narrower scope of responsibility-may not have authority
equivalent to a "general guardian" to waive the privilege that would nor-
mally protect work done on E's behalf.'42 Generally, however, L should
keep the contents of any will or estate plan confidential as far as possible;
this covers disclosure both to E's family and to E's guardian. The case
law has treated wills as uniquely requiring special protection. 143 Disclo-
sure of will contents to guardians, in particular, has been strongly
discouraged.' 44
With respect to E's estate plans, G has the power to manage E's prop-
140. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
141. See Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 787, in ABA/
BNA, supra note 16, at 801:3012 (1982). See also Florida State Bar Ass'n, Op. 72-40, in
1972 WL 18058 (holding that attorney should not turn over inventory of client's assets to
named executor while client is still alive).
142. See Committee on Prof. & Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan, Op. CI-
564, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:4811 (1980).
143. See Pond v. Faust, 155 P. 776 (Wash. 1916) (will is not an asset and need not be
turned over to guardian). But see Airey v. Airey, 250 So. 2d 52 (La. Ct. App. 1971)
(curator's duty is to preserve property, including will).
144. See In re Guardianship of York, 723 P.2d 448 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (denying
disclosure of will to prove unfitness and undue influence of guardian); Bauman v. Willis,
721 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (finding no cause to turn adequately safeguarded
will over to guardian).
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erty and may require access to such plans in order to manage effectively.
L may justify such necessary disclosures under Model Rule 1.6's "im-
pliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation" language, but
any disclosure should be as limited as possible."4 5 L should not in any
circumstances disclose the contents of E's will,'" and should counsel G
against unnecessary disclosure of other estate planning details.
Autonomic Analysis
As the guardian of E, G succeeds to all of E's interests, tangible and
intangible. G's obligation is to exercise for E the autonomy-preserving
and -promoting powers that E might reasonably have exercised. To do
so, G must have access to all information reasonably necessary for in-
formed decisionmaking on E's behalf. Therefore, subject to the possible
need to protect E from a crime or significant bodily injury, 47 L must
provide for G's complete access to E's files including E's will. It is, after
all, E's will that is to be protected; not L's will. As to abstract potentiali-
ties, as opposed to clear and present dangers, therefore, if L is concerned
about the legitimacy of G's use of the will, that issue ought to be resolved
at a later point, by judicial challenge.
b. Ward's Family is Unaware of the Type of Services Performed by
Lawyer
Same as example D.2.a, except that E's family is not aware that L
previously did estate planning for E. The family knows only that L did
legal work of an unspecified nature for E.
Empathic Analysis
Ordinarily, the type of service performed might be regarded as a "fact"
not properly covered by attorney-client privilege, but, again, wills are
unlike other legal documents. If the fact of the execution of the will is
not known, L should not disclose the information.'48 E's own decision
145. Disclosure of E's plans to G may not seem necessary to L's representation of E,
but in cases where an incapacitated client is involved, ethics opinions have tended to
stretch "authorized in order to carry out the representation" to cover the client's best
interest. Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.6; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 89-1530 (1989) (justifying disclosure of client's abuse of
medication by this exception to Model Rule 1.6).
146. The ban on disclosing will contents is broad, covering not just the incompetent
client situation, but also parent-child, etc. See, e.g., Committee on Ethics of the Mary-
land State Bar Ass'n, Op. 85-18, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:4351 (undated)
(attorney may not reveal fact that father is client for will preparation to son, and vice
versa [even identity of client is confidential]); Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Bar Asso-
ciation of Nassau County (N.Y.), Op. 87-33, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:6259
(1987) (forbidding disclosure of contents of will of now-incompetent client to relative
who wishes to begin conservatorship proceedings).
147. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.6(b)(l)
148. See Wigmore, supra note 74; United States v. Osborn, 409 F. Supp. 406, 410 (D.
Or. 1975) (execution of will by living person is impliedly confidential).
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not to inform his family is an additional justification for L not to disclose
the nature of his services. As to other legal work, L would be justified in
making known to G information required for G's proper management of
E's estate.
Autonomic Analysis
Courts have viewed the central issue in cases of this type as turning on
the impliedly confidential nature of information concerning the existence
of a client's will. Such an emphasis, however, too greatly focuses on the
supposedly inherent characteristics of will-making. From the autonomic
perspective, the issue ought to be seen more directly as focused on the
testator. As such, the issue is better stated as whether E has authorized
L's disclosure of the existence of a will. In the absence, therefore, of E's
affirmative instruction to disclose, L's duty is to assert the client's confi-
dentiality. Such an assertion of confidentiality is not simply a desire to
keep information from others. More positively stated, in Frank Slade-
like terms, 14 9 it is an expression of one's ability to control one's life
which, if lost, is tantamount to the loss of life itself. Accordingly, L owes
no duty to E's family to disclose information about the existence of a
will, because if such discussions are to take place, they must take place at
E's instruction. L's duty, if to anyone, is to E's guardian or executor.150
3. Representation of Client Who Is Apparently Incompetent
a. Client Appears Incompetent After Lawyer Has Been Retained to
Pursue Potential Litigation
E suffers a broken hip while being treated at a hospital and retains L to
represent him. Over the course of several weeks L meets with E a
number of times. E's memory seems to be weakening, but L attributes it
to medication and pain relievers. At their last meeting, however, E does
not recognize L, and when L mentions the case and the need to file suit if
settlement negotiations fail, E tells L to leave and not come back. Ap-
parently E has suffered a stroke, and full recovery of mental powers is
unlikely. Must L communicate with the hospital or its representatives
concerning E's condition? May L communicate with the hospital or its
representatives?
Empathic Analysis
L is not required to communicate with the hospital about E's condition
in regard to the possible litigation.15' Whether L should continue with
the potential litigation is a difficult question. The Restatement suggests
149. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
150. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
151. One ethics opinion went so far as to say that an attorney should not notify a
potentially adverse party of the ward's death. Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Birming-
ham (Ala.) Bar Ass'n, Op. 88-2, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:1202 (1988).
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that, while E has no representative, L should continue to press E's
claim. 152 The Model Rules, on the other hand, suggest that in such in-
stances L may act as E's de facto guardian."' 3 L must decide how much
weight to give E's apparent desire to discharge L or to terminate the
potential litigation. 5 4 These actions may appear irrational to L, and E's
incompetence may seem obvious, but L should also consider that E may
have other motives (e.g., he may not wish to face the stress of a possible
trial, or he may fear aggravating those upon whose care he currently
relies). 155
An interim step may be available to L. In some jurisdictions, the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem does not require a finding of incompe-
tency. 156 L would not be alone in deciding whether to act on L's
understanding of E's best interests or on L's understanding of what E
might want.' 57
Autonomic Analysis
When, in the course of the representation, L is confronted with a hos-
pitalized E who has apparently suffered a stroke during treatment, the
question raised is whether L must communicate with the hospital about
152. See Restatement, supra note 8, § 35(2) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992).
153. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.14(b). While both the Restatement and
the Model Rules give the lawyer some authority to act independently for an incapacitated
client, L needs to keep in mind that in some areas L cannot act in E's behalf; for example,
L could not accept a settlement offer. See id.; Restatement, supra note 8, at § 33. Even if
L decides at this juncture to continue without disclosing E's possible incapacity, he may
face the same dilemma later in the representation.
154. Normally L would be bound to withdraw after being discharged. However, when
unsure of the client's capacity, L should consider whether withdrawal is in the client's
best interest. See Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, Op.
89-3, in Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at OH:OPINIONS:8 (1990); Committee on Prof. &
Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan, Op. CI-1055, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16,
at 801:4889 (1984).
155. See Smith, supra note 134, at 72
156. See Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, Op. 89-3,
in Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at OH:OPINIONS:8 (1990) (allowing attorney for possibly
incompetent client to seek appointment of guardian ad litem; no finding of incompetency
required, no adversity problem).
157. Ethics opinions in general are divided over whether an attorney may violate strict
"no disclosure" rules in order to either evaluate a client's condition or initiate proceed-
ings for the appointment of a representative. For opinions regarding representatives, see
Standing Comm. on Prof. Resp. & Conduct of the State Bar of California, Op. 1989-112,
in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:1416 (1991) (not allowing attorney to disclose or
institute conservatorship proceedings [California has no equivalent of Model Rule 1.14]);
Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-12, in Nat'l Rep., supra
note 87, at IL:OPINIONS:8 (1990) (allowing attorney to withdraw with permission, if no
harm to client; no disclosure as duty of confidentiality comes before duty to court); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 89-1530 (1989) (finding
that disclosure under Model Rule 1.14(b) falls under "necessary to representation" ex-
ception in Model Rule 1.6). But see James R. Devine, The Ethics of Representing the
Disabled Client Does Model Rule L14 Adequately Resolve the Best Interests/Advocacy
Dilemma?, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 501-02 (1984) (arguing that current Model Rules 1.6 and
1.14 are incompatible).
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E's condition. For purposes of this example, we assume that L's effort to
have a guardian ad litem appointed on grounds other than incompetency
is not involved. 5 ' Accordingly, the answer depends both on the nature
of the proposed communication and on the scope of the representa-
tion.159 Assuming, however, that the proposed communications are rea-
sonably necessary to allow L to carry out the representation, L may
communicate with all relevant persons; moreover, in circumstances
threatening harm to the client or others, L will have a duty to do So.161
By communicating with the hospital about E's condition, however, L
does run the risks inherent in communicating with persons who, on the
one hand, are not represented by counsel, 6 ' or who, on the other hand,
are known to be represented by counsel.' 6 Especially if the communica-
tion is about the circumstances of E's hip injury, the applicable consider-
ations will include full disclosure obligations as to L's role and interest as
well as the need to seek opposing counsel's permission prior to discussing
a matter with opposing counsel's client.
b. Suit has Already Been Filed, Lawyer's Communication With Court
Same as example D.3.a, except that suit has already been filed against
the hospital. Must L communicate with the court regarding E's condi-
tion? May L communicate with the court?
Empathic Analysis
Most jurisdictions provide but do not require that an incompetent may
be represented by a guardian or some other party.163 Were L to continue
with litigation without notifying the court, E's suit might be dismissed at
158. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
159. See infra example D.3.b.
160. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal.
1976)(despite confidentiality duty, psychologist possessing first-hand knowledge of cli-
ent's homicidal intention to harm an unaware third-party had duty to warn).
161. Model Rule 4.3 requires:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel,
a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misun-
derstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable ef-
forts to correct the misunderstanding.
Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 4.3; see also Model Code, supra note 13, DR 7-
104(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from giving advice to an unrepresented person, other
than the advice to obtain counsel).
162. Model Rule 4.2 provides that: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not com-
municate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the
other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so." Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 4.2; see
Model Code, supra note 13, DR 7-104(A)(1) (substantially the same prohibition).
163. See Withers v. Tucker, 145 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Wis. 1966) (finding that client's
interests were not prejudiced by not being represented by guardian ad litem when lawyer
presumably knew of client's disability by time of trial, a statute required a minor to be
represented by guardian ad litem, and incompetents did not need representation until
court became aware of disability).
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a later date if E's competency came into question."6' L's decision to no-
tify the court may depend on local requirements for the representation of
incompetents.165
Autonomic Analysis
If E suffers his mental deterioration during the course of the hip injury
lawsuit against the hospital, that development alone suggests no reason
for advising the court. If L's representation had been more general, how-
ever, (for example as a guardian) then the changes in E's condition might
well warrant court notification. On the facts, however, L need not advise
the court-it is a matter of discretion absent a law or rule-but must
take steps to assure that a guardian is appointed for E.
An appropriate guardian would be E's nearest kin. If unknown or
unavailable, a motion to the court for appointment of E's closest friend
as guardian would be appropriate. L's role in the appointment of a
guardian for E should be minimal and at arm's length. If asked, L may
advise interested good samaritans about their need to have legal counsel,
but L should take care to assure that his advice does not suggest self-
dealing. Beyond L's role as B's representative in the negligence matter, L
has no general authority or responsibility for E's affairs.
If no one steps forward to assert E's interest, L may advise the court
that E is now in need of guardianship. On the limited facts presented, it
would not be inconsistent with L's role for him to be named as G's
guardian.
c. Petition for Incompetency Filed; Lawyer's Testimony in
Guardianship Proceedings
Same as example D.3.a, except that E's sister has filed a petition to
have E adjudicated an incompetent and for the appointment of the sister
as the guardian of the person and estate of E. Another attorney is repre-
164. See Bodnar v. Bodnar, 441 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 404 U.S. 841
(1971) (dismissing suit without prejudice when plaintiff's mental capacity became an issue
and plaintiff refused examination). But see Donnelly v. Parker, 486 F.2d 402, 407-09
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that trial court's refusal to order examination of party when
capacity was questioned was not clearly erroneous).
165. L should also keep in mind that some opinions have considered that a failure to
prosecute E's case, given that at the outset of the representation E was clear in his objec-
tives, might itself be an ethical breach. See Donnelly, 486 F.2d at 411 (Robb, J., concur-
ring) ("Indeed, had counsel failed to carry out his client's instructions he might have been
guilty of professional misconduct.") (footnote omitted); Florida State Bar Ass'n, Op. 73-
25, in 1974 WL 20331 (1974) (continuing attorney's duty to protect incompetent client's
rights until withdrawal permitted by court, and noting that petition for withdrawal
should not mention competency).
Nonetheless, if L does decide to continue without notifying the court, L must consider
that the court may at any time question L's authority in representing F, see Donnelly, 486
F.2d at 407 n.20, and L should take care not to overreach. See Florida State Bar Ass'n,
Op. 85-4, in 1985 WL 72687 (1985).
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senting the sister in the guardianship action. L is requested to testify in
the action. Must L testify? May L testify?
Empathic Analysis
L probably should not testify at all; certainly he should not share the
opinions he formed about E in the course of his representation of E. Eth-
ics opinions agree that such information is confidential, and any disclo-
sure should be as limited as possible, if at all.'66 There is case law,
however, that observations of dress and demeanor are not covered by the
attorney-client privilege,'67 but the line between non-privileged observa-
tions and privileged impressions is not clearly drawn. 168 L would best be
advised to invoke the attorney-client privilege and not testify against E.
L's observations are based not only on dress and demeanor but also on
E's reaction to the representation.
Autonomic Analysis
As a general matter, L may not testify against E's interest if E's sister
files a petition to have him adjudicated an incompetent and herself ap-
pointed E's guardian. Because L is in a lawyer/client relationship with
E, L must decline to testify as to matters learned in the course of his
representation or as to matters which are confidential or secret.' 69 L
should assert the privilege and, if subpoenaed, force the sister to establish
the existence of limited, narrow, unprivileged information about which L
might testify.
d. Concurrent Representation of Party Seeking Adjudication of
Incompetence
Same as example D.3.c, except that E's sister has requested that L
represent her in filing the petition for guardianship. May L represent the
sister?
166. Committee on Prof. & Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Michigan, Op. CI-550,
in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:4809 (1980) (attorney's impression of client's mental
abilities is privileged); Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Bar Association of Nassau
County (N.Y.), Op. 90-17, in The Nassau Lawyer, Feb. 1991, at 2 (attorney's observa-
tions of client's eccentricities are privileged).
167. See Scott v. Scott, 417 S.E.2d 818, 823 (N.C. App. 1992) (holding attorney's ob-
servations of client's dress and demeanor not confidential, as anyone might observe);
Bishop v. Superior Court, 724 P.2d 23, 29 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that in competency hear-
ing, attorney-client privilege does not protect attorney's observations of client's behavior).
168. See United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 1964) (Sobeloff, C.J.,
concurring) (covering privileged and non-privileged impressions in this context, because
impossible to separate). Scott followed Kendrick, although noting with approval the dis-
sent. Both Scott and Bishop concerned competency hearings; the refusal to find attorney-
client privilege also may have been influenced by finding that the competency hearings
were not "adversarial."
169. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (attorney-client confidentiality).
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Empathic Analysis
L may not represent E's sister. While some ethics opinions suggest
that L could appropriately initiate competency hearings, the fact remains
that a competency hearing poses a significant threat to E's autonomy.
All ethical codes prevent an attorney from taking a position adverse" ° to
a present client (if L is still indeed E's attorney) or adverse to a former
client if the matter is "substantially related" or involves confidential in-
formation relating to the former client. 7  While L may believe that the
appointment of a representative is in E's best interests and, thus, may
decline to represent E, L certainly should not represent the adverse
interest. 172
Autonomic Analysis
It is also impermissible for L to represent E's sister in an action to
establish herself as E's guardian.t173 Since the guardianship is contested,
any participation by L on behalf of the sister would result in L being
impermissibly on both sides of the case.
e. Lawyer Initiating Petition for Guardianship
Same as example D.3.c, except that no one has filed a petition for
guardianship. L believes, however, that a guardianship for E may be
warranted. May L file the petition for guardianship?
171
Empathic Analysis
Ethics opinions are split on this question. Some suggest that with-
drawal, without disclosure, is the only appropriate response; others sug-
gest that L may initiate a guardianship proceeding and still remain E's
170. In some cases, competency hearings have been considered not adversarial. See
Bishop, 724 P.2d at 26. But given the high stakes involved-a loss of autonomy and
perhaps involuntary commitment for E, potentially self-interested family members-L
should consider the action as an adversarial one. Murphy, supra note 128, at 904.
171. See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule 1.7 cmt. The conflicts may be especially
acute if L has represented other members of E's family, such as Es spouse; a finding of
incompetency might be prejudicial to E, but a failure to adequately protect E may be
prejudicial to E's spouse. Professional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleve-
land, Op. 86-5, in Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at OH:OPINIONS:25, 33 (1987).
172. Ethics Comm. of the Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Op. 450 (1988), in ABA/
BNA, supra note 16, at 901:1703 (1988) (lawyer may not represent petitioner); Profes-
sional Ethics Comm. of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, Op. 89-3, in Nat'l Rep.,
supra note 87, at OH:OPINIONS:8 (1990) (stating that attorney should not simultane-
ously represent client in one matter and petition for guardian at same time). But see
Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 511, in 65 I11. BJ. 386
(1977) (allowing lawyer to represent potential conservator if long relation with client has
convinced lawyer of necessity and lawyer does not stand to profit personally).
173. Cf supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
174. Examples D.3.a to D.3.e are based in part on Situation 9 in Professor Donaldson's
ALI-ABA outline. See Donaldson, supra note 58, at 16-17.
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attorney. 175 L's decision may also depend, however, on tangential con-
siderations, such as whether the relevant statutes afford L standing to
initiate such proceedings.
As a practical matter, L may in fact be the best person to initiate pro-
ceedings. By going directly to the court, L may be able to limit disclo-
sure more significantly than by communicating with family members in
hopes that they might initiate proceedings.' 7 6 L's initiation of guardian-
ship proceedings may also have a salutary effect; since there would un-
doubtedly be lowered expectations by relatives that L is on "the family's
side" in the proceedings, the action might save him from conflict of inter-
est problems.
Autonomic Analysis
Because L represents E, L may take no action against E which has not
been, at least implicitly, directed by E. If, therefore, L concludes that E
is in need of guardianship, L's proper recourse is simply to await E's
sister's filing of a petition or to withdraw immediately. This approach
would preserve E's autonomy while signalling the need for others, in-
cluding the sister, to exercise the requisite oversight.
4. Client Requests Radical Change in Will
Several years ago L prepared a will for E, an aged client. The will
made several modest bequests for charitable purposes and left the residue
of E's substantial estate equally to his three children, all of whom live in
a distant state.
E had always been a devoted family man, but has been somewhat re-
clusive since his wife died seven years ago. E now requests L to prepare a
new will under which his entire estate would be left to a designated
animal humane society. In trying to understand this radical change in
plans, L learns that E has been spending a lot of time with a neighbor
who is a volunteer worker at the humane society. L also learns that E
has expressed doubts that he is the parent of the three children, although
he refuses to explain the reasons for his doubts. Moreover, E rejects L's
suggestion that blood tests may resolve the doubt. E says that it is a
personal matter and of no business of L.
All that L is really sure about is that E's demeanor is strange and his
capacity doubtful. May L communicate any of this information to the
175. See Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Op. 89-12, in Nat'l
Rep., supra note 87, at IL:OPINIONS:8 (1990) (withdrawal, no disclosure). Committee
on Ethics & Prof. Resp. of the Pennsylvania State Bar Ass'n, Op. 90-89, in ABA/BNA,
supra note 16, at 901:7327 (undated) (initiate proceeding).
176. See Committee on Prof. Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York,
Op. 1987-7, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:6406 (1987) (allowing attorney to dis-
close to court for protective action, but should take all possible actions to protect client's
confidences, including sealed proceedings if possible).
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three children? 177
Empathic Analysis
Few ethics opinions counsel going to a family member in this situation.
Usually it is left to the attorney to seek guidance from a medical profes-
sional or to begin proceedings independently. Perhaps this reflects a rec-
ognition that the interests of family members, despite good intentions,
may be unavoidably adverse.'78  As in earlier situations, L should not
reveal the contents of current or prior wills to E's children. 179 L's deci-
sion about whether to reveal his opinion of E's mental state may depend
on what L knows of E's overall family situation.
Autonomic Analysis
L may not communicate to E's children the fact that his client, E, has
told him that he intends to disinherit them. Again, it is E's autonomy
that L was engaged to preserve and promote. The children definitely
have grounds to be concerned, but their potential future interest in E's
estate does not measure up to E's actual interest in his own autonomy. If
L believes that E is no longer competent to make decisions about his
estate, L should simply withdraw from E's representation. From a prac-
tical standpoint, a motion to withdraw would alert the children to the
need, if any, to help their father find new counsel.' 80
III. SOME FINAL REMARKS
Given the myriad confidentiality issues to be found in the attorney-
client relationship, a question asked by Frank Slade in Scent of a Wo-
man 1 1 comes to mind. Turning in response to Charlie Simms' grabbing
of his arm to assist him in exiting a taxi, Slade asks: "Are you blind?"
Charlie, confused by the absurdity of the question, replies that he is not.
To which Slade replies, "Then don't grab me! I grab you! You don't
grab me!" 18
2
The delicate balance which the lawyer must achieve in handling the
177. This example is based on Situation 10 in Professor Donaldson's ALI-ABA out-
line. See Donaldson, supra note 58, at 17-18.
178. Cf Maine Professional Ethics Commission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar,
Op. 84, in ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 901:4205 (1988) (allowing attorney to inform
son of father's suspected incompetency only if son has no adverse interest, and attorney
may seek state protective services instead of approaching family member). But see Com-
mittee on Prof. Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 81-32, in
ABA/BNA, supra note 16, at 801:6322 (1981) (attorney should seek guidance from rela-
tives). For possible examples of adverse family interests, see Professional Ethics Comm.
of the Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland, Op. 86-5, in Nat'l Rep., supra note 87, at
OH:OPINIONS:25 (1987).
179. See infra examples D.2.a and D.2.b.
180. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (concerning noisy withdrawals).
181. Supra note 1.
182. Id
1994] 1247
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
confidences inherent in legal representation lies somewhere between giv-
ing help and giving no help at all. The lawyer must choose between grab-
bing a client to do for the client what is best, and letting the client grab
hold of the lawyer just enough so that the client feels safe in making his
or her own way. The risk in the latter strategy is, of course, that a client
may overestimate his or her capacity for self-reliance. Rather than life-
affirming autonomy, exploitation at the hands of loved ones (or even the
lawyer) may be the actual result. Equally daunting, however, are the
risks inherent in the alternative approach. The further one moves in the
empathic direction, the more necessary it is to assume the adequacy of
one's knowledge of the client's true interests. Worse still, in the course of
doing for the client what one supposes is best, the danger is heightened
that a lawyer will in actuality be tempted to do even better for himself or
herself.
The instant discussions, from the empathic and autonomic perspec-
tives, underscore the different ways lawyers can view the needs and cir-
cumstances of their clients. Depending on the philosophical premises
that are applied to the interpretation of accepted legal and ethical rules,
reasonable lawyers will differ in the way they respond to particular situa-
tions. They will disagree not only about appropriate ultimate disposi-
tions, but also about emphasis, timing, sequence and the values to be
protected.
In discussing the joint representation of a husband and wife seeking
mirror wills, for example, we noted that the majority rule favors the law-
yer's withdrawal from the representation when one spouse discloses rele-
vant information to the lawyer but asks that it be held in confidence from
the other. We also noted, however, that some courts have begun to view
the lawyer's loyalty to the nondisclosing partner as imposing a higher
duty to disclose such information notwithstanding the request for confi-
dentiality. Over and above legal doctrine, such disagreements say as
much about evolving societal attitudes regarding the capacity and inde-
pendence of the freely transacting individuals-largely elderly-who are
likely to be engaged in such arrangement-making. They tell us, too, that
the selection of the appropriate option on the empathic-autonomic con-
tinuum involves decisionmaking criteria which must be continually re-
evaluated.
What is equally striking, however, is that over a broad range of situa-
tions there is more agreement than not on the appropriate ethical course
to be taken, regardless of whether the analysis of the situation is em-
pathic or autonomic. Both approaches agree that client attempts to ma-
nipulate the lawyer concerning relevant information in the joint
representation context may well require the lawyer to demand that the
client make a rectifying disclosure or that the lawyer, himself, make the
disclosure. They agree too on an underlying principle: in the modem
era, it must be recognized-especially given the joint nature of a marital
representation and the intent that marital information be shared
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openly-that after-acquired knowledge about the intentions of one or the
other spouse (e.g., concerning divorce, children out of wedlock, or par-
amours) is information which must be disclosed when such disclosure
can further the goals of the representation.
Similarly, in intergenerational situations, both the empathic and auto-
nomic approaches counsel that particular regard be given to considera-
tion of the sequence of the representation. When, as is most often likely
to be the case, the older generation first engages the lawyer, the lawyer's
duty of loyalty should be clear. Generally speaking, children and other
potential beneficiaries ought not to look to the existing lawyer-client rela-
tionship for information or assistance to vindicate their aspirations. In-
stead, as in the situations where a child seeks access to a will, desires
durable powers of attorney from a parent, or seeks appointment as the
parent's guardian, both the empathic and autonomic approaches urge
that the lawyer's duty be analyzed in terms of sequential representation
considerations. The lawyer's duty is to the party he or she first
represents.
Finally, in both the fiduciary-representation and client-under-disability
contexts, the empathic and autonomic perspectives agree on the principle
that loyalty to the ultimate beneficiary of the lawyer's services, on the
one hand, and to the disabled client's wishes (as best they can be under-
stood), on the other other hand, are the relevant considerations. We rec-
ognize, however, that depending on the jurisdiction, these considerations
will, perhaps, not be dispositive.
We urge, therefore, a middle ground: to the extent possible the lawyer
must strive to assure that the fiduciary carries out his or her duties. The
lawyer should do so by persuading when possible and threatening disclo-
sure when permissible. In no instance, however, would we deem testify-
ing against one's client, or otherwise challenging a client's interest, an
appropriate outcome. When the lawyer deems it appropriate to affirma-
tively contest the interest of a client, withdrawal from the representation
is required.
Ultimately, therefore, the effort to contrast the empathic and auto-
nomic approach suggests a larger principle. Because the lawyer's repre-
sentation of a client will inevitably involve both empathic and autonomic
concerns, appropriate consideration of those concerns is not, first, to be
undertaken at the stage when questions about the lawyer's duty of confi-
dentiality are on the table. More appropriately, such concerns should be
identified, discussed, and to the extent possible, resolved as part of an
initial representation agreement. Accordingly, we urge that lawyers en-
gaged in the representation of all clients (and elderly clients in particular)
must perceive it to be their duty to provide a comprehensive engagement
letter, which, at a minimum, addresses concerns regarding the nature of
joint representation of husband and wife, including the handling of after-
acquired information which one party desires to be held in confidence.
An appropriate engagement letter should also address intergenera-
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tional concerns (including potential disputes about access to the will, as-
set accountings, and issues of fairness among siblings). Furthermore,
clients should be advised in detail about unforeseen exigencies, such as
the lawyer's role in dealing with fiduciaries who might be named (e.g.,
guardians or attorneys in fact) or in dealing with the client himself or
herself in the event the client becomes disabled.'
We recognize that the assumption of such additional obligations will
be viewed by some lawyers as additional burdens that many clients can-
not understand and many lawyers are incapable of bearing administra-
tively or financially. Weighed against the fast-moving transition in
thinking that is reflected here in the empathic-autonomic dialogue, how-
ever, there is no alternative to lawyers moving in this manner to further
empower their clients. As importantly, there is no alternative to lawyers
fostering greater client information as a means of protecting their clients
and themselves from second-guessing by disgruntled clients, collateral in-
terests, and the courts.
The complexity and vitality involved in the relationship between
183. Certainly it is no great stretch from the present Model Rules to suggest that the
lawyer at least consider raising these typical questions of confidentiality at the outset of
the representation of an elderly client. If the basis or rate of the lawyer's fee should be
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, See Model Rules, supra note 13, Rule
1.5, should not these more personal issues of what to do, for example, in the event of
diminished capacity, also be aired and perhaps reduced to writing? The authors do not
mean to suggest that at the current time it is malpractice to fail to use engagement letters,
for it appears that many skilled trusts and estates practitioners are not yet routinely using
them. Nevertheless, it appears that the trend is toward the more frequent use of engage-
ment letters in this, an area of the law that was once thought too personal for such
business documents.
In addition to confidentiality, a thoughtful listing of related issues for consideration by
the lawyer is found in a questionnaire on ethics formulated for the American College of
Trust and Estate Counsel by Messrs. Francis J. Collin, Jr., Martin Heckscher, and Pro-
fessor Randall W. Roth. See Letter from Frank Collin, et al. to ACTEC Fellows (Febru-
ary 9, 1994) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (transmitting results of
questionnaire). Among other things, the questionnaire asked: Upon being retained by a
new client do you routinely ask him or her to confirm that he or she knows of no existing
or potential conflict of interest that exists or could arise because of your firm's representa-
tion of other clients? If a client has been referred to you by someone with whom you
enjoy a special relationship, do you routinely disclose that relationship to the client? If
someone other than the client has agreed to pay your fee for representing the client, do
you routinely tell the client that someone else will pay your fee and who that person is?
Do you routinely inform your clients what action you may be required to take if a conflict
arises in the future between their interests and those of another client? When represent-
ing a married couple, do you routinely discuss with the clients the potential conflict that
could arise from the representation? If you represent more than one member of a family
(e.g. parent/child, brother/sister, grandparent/grandchild, etc.), do you routinely discuss
with the clients the potential conflict that could arise from the representation? If you
represent an estate or trust, do you routinely inform those who have an interest in the
estate or trust (as fiduciaries or beneficiaries) which interests you represent and which you
do not represent? If an estate planning client decides to appoint you as a fiduciary, do
you routinely set forth in writing or require the client to set forth in writing how and why
the appointment was made? At some point in time, do you routinely inform long-stand-
ing clients about any of the ethical concerns that you routinely inform new clients about?
See id.
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Frank Slade and Charlie Simms is not confined to the movie screen. In
every interaction between people who rely on each other, there is some
element of control that must be surrendered. The elderly, like everyone
else, must confront their humanity and assert their own legal and moral
condition. But they cannot do so without knowing more about them-
selves and their options-about what it means to be alive and elderly,
and about the relationship between dependence and independence. Pro-
viding this knowlege is, after all, the lawyer's role. And it is the lawyer's
desire to embrace and empower clients in the best sense of the attorney-
client relationship that has always been the essence of the sense of a
client.

